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JUSTICE BY GEOGRAPHY AND RACE: THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
IN MARYLAND, 1978-1999
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, ROBERT BRAME, SARAH BACON AND
ANDREW DITCHFIELD*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 1 7 th, 2004, Steven Oken was executed by the State of
Maryland.' His was the first execution in six years and only the third
person executed in the state since the state's new death penalty law
took effect in July of 1978.2 His execution lifted a moratorium that
was placed on the death penalty by Maryland's former Governor,
Parris N. Glendenning who, while supporting the death penalty, was
concerned about how it was being administered.3 Apprehension
regarding the death penalty in Maryland is not new.
There have been repeated suggestions over the years that the
imposition of the death penalty in Maryland has been influenced by
factors such as race and the particular legal jurisdiction where the
homicide occurred. One source of this speculation are the
characteristics of the condemned on Maryland's death row. For
example, in January 2004, eight of the twelve (67%) men on death row
were African-American, eleven of twelve (92%) were sentenced to
death for the killing of at least one white victim, and in seven of these
twelve cases (58%) the offender was black and the victim white. 4
* Raymond Paternoster, Robert Brame, Sarah Bacon, and Andrew Ditchfield, University of
Maryland, College Park. Dr. Raymond Paternoster (B.A., University of Delaware, 1973;
M.S., Southern Illinois University, 1975; Ph.D., Florida State University, 1978) is Professor of
Criminology at the University of Maryland. Dr. Robert Brame (B.A., University of North
Carolina, Charlotte, 1988; M.S., University of North Carolina, Charlotte, 1991; Ph.D.,
University of Maryland, 1997) is an Associate Professor of Criminology at the University of
South Carolina. Sarah Bacon (B.A., University of Colorado, 1997; M.A. University of
Maryland, 2003) is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Maryland. Andrew Ditchfield
(B.A., Amherst College, M.A., University of Maryland) will attend the Juris Doctor program
at Georgetown University Law Center in Fall, 2004.
1. Julie Bykowicz and Alec MacGillis, Md. Puts Oken to Death, BALT. SUN, June 18,
2004, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. This information is contained in the database for this research project. Justice By
Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland 1978-1999
Database (on file with first author). It is also available from the Maryland Office of the Public
Defender, Death Penalty Defense Unit.
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Moreover, of these eight (67%) came from just one jurisdiction,
Baltimore County.
5
It is these kinds of "statistics" that have fueled the belief that
there is some mischief in the way Maryland has administered the death
penalty. Critics of the death penalty can point to the fact that African
Americans do not make up 67% of Maryland's population, black on
white killings do not make up nearly 60% of all homicides, nor do
90% of the homicides in Maryland occur in Baltimore County. It
would appear at first blush, then, that African-Americans, especially
those who slay whites, and defendants from Baltimore County are
disproportionately represented on death row and that such disparity is
due to discrimination. However suggestive of racial or geographic
disparity these figures may be, they cannot on their own provide much
support for the position that the state's death penalty system is biased
by either race or geography. In fact, even if all offenders on
Maryland's death row were African-American, and all had killed white
victims, and all came from one jurisdiction, that alone would not
constitute adequate social scientific evidence of race or geographic
disparity. If, for example, African-American offenders who killed
white victims also happened to commit the most aggravated and
serious murders in the state then their disproportionate appearance on
death row would be due to the kinds of crimes they committed and not
racial bias.
Therefore, it was necessary to collect detailed data from the
broadest possible group of offenses and offenders to determine if
Maryland's system does, in fact, possess any racial or geographic
disparities. The need to study the death penalty in Maryland was
recognized and in September of 2000, Governor Parris N. Glendening
commissioned the current empirical study of the death penalty, and
subsequently imposed a moratorium on all executions in the state until
the study's completion.
The purpose of this study was to examine whether the
imposition of the death penalty in Maryland was affected by race
(either of the offender, victim or both) or geography (the jurisdiction
where the crime occurred). The influence of race and geography was
examined at four critical decision-making points in the administration
of Maryland's capital punishment system:
1. The decision of the state's attorney to file a formal notification
to seek a death sentence;
5. Id.
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2. The decision of the state's attorney to not withdraw a death
notification once filed, in other words, the decision to make the
death notification "stick" to the offender;
3. The decision of the state's attorney to advance a death-eligible
offense to a penalty trial upon a conviction for first-degree murder;
and
4. The decision of the jury or judge to sentence a defendant to
death.6
The principal goal of this research was to estimate the effect
that race and geography has on these four decision points while taking
into account numerous case characteristics that may explain these
decisions. There are many factors that affect these decision making
points, such as the criminal history of the offender, the number of
victims, the brutality of the murder that must be considered when
examining the effect of race and geography. These factors were taken
into consideration when completing the study.
Part 1I of this study provides a brief description of the recent
history of capital punishment in the state of Maryland, including
concerns about the fairness with which it has been imposed in the past.
This part also describes the legal structure or mechanics of the death
penalty under Maryland law. Part III reviews the past death penalty
research in Maryland. The study describes in Part IV the methodology
followed in this empirical study of the death penalty in Maryland, with
particular attention devoted to describing how we characterized an
offense as "death eligible", and the statistical strategy followed in
determining the influence of race and geography on the four decision
making points. Part V contains a detailed presentation of our results -
what we found with respect to the administration of the death penalty.
In Part VI, the study concludes with a summary of our findings.
6. We did not look at the pre-prosecutorial aspects of the case, which may include
interrogation, arrest, police investigation, pretrial hearings, or a prosecutorial decision to
charge for a lesser offense such as manslaughter. It should, however, be noted that these
decisions have a filtering effect on the cases that eventually arrive at the state's attorneys'
office.
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II. A RECENT HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND
A. Pre-1978 Maryland Death Penalty Statutes
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court declared then-
existing procedures for imposing capital punishment unconstitutional
because they gave juries unlimited and standardless discretion when
sentencing offenders to death.7  The 5-4 decision in Furman v.
Georgia, had significant constitutional ramifications. The court held
that the then-existing manner in which death sentences were imposed
created a risk that defendants would be sentenced to death on the basis
of constitutionally suspect factors-for example, that the capital
sentencing system was discriminatory, or that because the capital
sentencing system was arbitrary and capricious, there was no rational
and meaningful basis to distinguish offenders sentenced to death from
those whose life was spared.9
The practical impact of Furman, called into question the
constitutionality of death penalty statutes in states, including Maryland
that gave wide discretion to the authority responsible for sentencing
criminals to death. In 1972, Maryland law provided no guidance or
standards to juries as to the appropriate penalty in deciding which
defendants convicted of rape and murder should be sentenced to
death.10 At that time, a death sentence in rape and murder cases was
7. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
8. Furman v. Georgia was a 5-4 opinion of some 233 pages with each Justice writing
his own opinion, and no one Justice in the majority joining any part of the opinion of another.
Robert Weisberg characterized Furman as "not so much a case as a badly orchestrated opera,
with nine characters taking turns to offer their own arias." Robert Weisberg, Deregulating
Death, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 305, 315 (1983).
9. Justice Douglas argued that "these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their
operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not
compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel
and unusual' punishments" Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57. In his opinion, Justice Stewart
characterized standardless capital statutes the following way: "These death sentences are cruel
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual... the
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of
death has in fact been imposed." Id. at 309-310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White
concluded that under these statutes "the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even
for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Id. at 313 (White, J.,
concurring).
10. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1967) (current version at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 2-303 (2002)).
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mandatory in Maryland unless the jury specifically stated in its guilty
verdict "without capital punishment."
Based on Furman, the Maryland Court of Appeals invalidated
the state's death penalty statute in Bartholmey v. State.12 Defendant
Joseph James Bartholomey and three other defendants on Maryland's
death row had their death sentences vacated to life imprisonment and
the case paved the way for other defendants to have their death
sentences vacated. 13  The court held that "[w]e entertain not the
slightest doubt that the imposition of the death sentence under any of
the presently existing discretionary statutes of Maryland which
authorize, but do not require, that penalty is unconstitutional under
Furman as violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
federal constitution."
14
Subsequent to Bartholmey, the Maryland legislature enacted a
new death penalty statute that was intended to remedy the problem of
unguided or standardless discretion as identified by the Furman
Court. 5 The new statute16 addressed the problem of giving too much
discretion to juries by establishing eight narrowly defined categories of
11. When Furman was decided, the Maryland statute stated that:
Every person convicted of murder in the first degree ... shall suffer death,
or undergo a confinement in the penitentiary of the State for the period of
their natural life, in the discretion of the court before whom such person
may be tried; provided, however, that the jury in a murder case ... may
add thereto the words, 'without capital punishment,' in which case the
sentence of the court shall be imprisonment for life.
Bartholmey v. State, 297 A.2d 696, 699 n.l(Md. 1972) (quoting MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 413
(1967) (current version at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303 (2002)).
12. Bartholomey v. State, 297 A.2d 696 (Md. 1972).
13. Id. at 707-08, 707 n.18, 708 n.19.
14. Id. at 701.
15. In his dissent in Furman, Chief Justice Burger noted both the ambiguity of the
decision and two possible remedies to the defects in standardless juries found by the plurality:
While I would not undertake to make a definitive statement as to the
parameters of the Court's ruling, it is clear that if state legislatures and the
Congress wish to maintain the availability of capital punishment,
significant statutory changes will have to be made. Since the two pivotal
concurring opinions [those of Justice Stewart and Justice White] turn on
the assumption that the punishment of death is now meted out in a random
and unpredictable manner, legislative bodies may seek to bring their laws
into compliance with the Court's ruling by providing standards for juries
and judges to follow in determining the sentence in capital cases or by
more narrowly defining the crimes for which the penalty is to be imposed.
If such standards can be devised or the crimes more meticulously defined,
the result cannot be detrimental.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 400-01 (1972).
16. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 413 (1976) (current version at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 2-303 (2002)).
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first-degree murder. 17  A finding that one or more of these
circumstances existed, plus findings of two other factors,18 resulted in
a mandatory death sentence. The new statute took effect on July 1,
1975,19 and Maryland again began to sentence defendants to death.
In July 1976, the United States Supreme Court decided three
cases that upheld the constitutionality of capital statutes that structured
and guided the discretion of capital juries2° and judges, 21 but struck
down mandatory statutes in two other cases.22  The Court held that
mandatory statutes failed to allow the decision-maker in the trial-jury
or judge-to consider the unique culpability of individual defendants
and thus treated them "as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass
to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death. 23
The statute in effect in Maryland was indistinguishable from
the North Carolina and Louisiana statutes rejected by the Court,24 and
17. Under the 1975 statute, these eight circumstances were:
(i) The defendant committed the murder at a time when he was confined
or under sentence of confinement to any correctional institution in this
State; (ii) the defendant committed the murder in furtherance of an attempt
to escape from or evade the lawful custody, arrest, or detention of or by a
law-enforcement officer, correctional officer, or guard; (iii) the victim was
a hostage taken or attempted to be taken in the course of a kidnapping or
an attempt to kidnap; (iv) the victim was a child abducted in violation of §
2 of this article; (v) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to an
agreement or contract to commit the murder for pecuniary gain; (vi) at the
time of the murder, the defendant was under a sentence of life
imprisonment; (vii) the defendant committed more than one offense of
murder in the first degree arising out of the same or separate incidents;
(viii) the defendant committed the murder while committing or attempting
to commit robbery.
Id.
18. The statute mandated a sentence of death for first degree murder if: "[the accused]
is found by the trier of fact to have been the person who actually committed an act which
proximately caused the victim's death; and (2) [a]t the time of the commission of the act, [the
accused] was 18 years of age or older; and, (3) the murder was committed under one or more
of the circumstances. Id.
19. Id.
20. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
21. Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
22. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976).
23. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
24. The mandatory North Carolina statute held unconstitutional in Woodson read:
Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment. - A murder
which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait,
imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate
and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration
or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or
other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be
punished with death.
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was therefore constitutionally suspect. Recognizing this, the Maryland
Court of Appeals vacated the two death sentences handed down under
the revised 1975 statute in Blackwell v. State.25  In response to
Blackwell, the Maryland legislature constructed a guided discretion
26statute during its 1977 and 1978 sessions. This new guided
discretion statute was modeled along the lines of the Georgia law 27 and
became effective on July 1, 1978. It provides the foundation for
Maryland's current capital punishment law.28 In August of 1979, the
SeeN.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1975).
The mandatory Maryland statute was facially similar. It mandated the imposition of the
death penalty if the accused actually committed the act which caused the victim's death, was
18 years of age or older at the time of the crime, and the murder was committed under one or
more of the following circumstances:
(i) The defendant committed the murder at a time when he was
confined or under sentence of confinement to any correctional institution
in this State;
(ii) The defendant committed the murder in furtherance of an attempt
to escape from or evade the lawful custody, arrest, or detention of or by a
law-enforcement officer, correctional officer, or guard;
(iii) The victim was a hostage taken or attempted to be taken in the
course of a kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap;
(iv) The victim was a child abducted in violation of § 2 of this article;
(v) The defendant committed the murder pursuant to an agreement or
contract to commit the murder for pecuniary gain;
(vi) At the time of the murder, the defendant was under a sentence of
life imprisonment;
(vii) The defendant committed more than one offense of murder in
the first degree arising out of the same or separate incidents;
(viii) The defendant committed the murder while committing or
attempting to commit robbery.
MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 413 (1976) (current version at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303
(2002)).
25. Blackwell v. State, 365 A.2d 545 (Md. 1976). In Blackwell, the Maryland Court of
Appeals noted that the mandatory capital statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana that were
struck down were infirm because they failed to allow a consideration of the unique
characteristics of individual defendants. The Maryland statute, they reasoned, was virtually
indistinguishable in this regard from North Carolina's and Louisiana's:
The Maryland death penalty statute limits the imposition of the death
sentence to eight narrowly drawn categories of first degree murder in
cases where the accused actually committed an act which proximately
caused the victim's death and where he was at least 18 years of age when
the crime was considered. The statute does not provide any other standards
whereby the sentencing authority can consider the individual
circumstances or characteristics of either the offense or offender; indeed,
all those convicted under the statute are treated alike, without regard to the
circumstances.
Id. at 549.
26. 1978 Md. Laws 3, amended by 1979 Md. Laws 521 (current version at MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 2-303, 2-401 (2002)).
27. GA. CODE ANN. §§26-1101, 26-1311, 26-1902, 26-2001, 26-2201, 26-3301 (1972).
28. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 2-201-2-202, 2-301, 2-303 (2002).
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first death sentence under the state's new law was imposed on Richard
Danny Tichnell in Wicomico County.29
B. Maryland's Current Capital Statute3"
The following factors must be satisfied for a defendant to be
sentenced to death under Maryland's death penalty statute:
1. After 1987,31 the defendant must be 18 years old
or older at the time of the offense. 32
2. After 1989, 33 the defendant cannot be deemed
mentally retarded, with mental retardation established
at the penalty phase of the capital trial by a
preponderance of the evidence. A jury finding of
mental retardation must be unanimous.
3. The defendant must have been convicted of
first-degree murder and have been found to be a
principal in the first degree. The "principalship"
requirement means that a defendant is considered a
principal if that defendant is convicted of first-degree
murder and is either the actual killer or the one who
pays the killer. A jury finding of principalship must be
unanimous. There is one exception to the principalship
requirement. When the aggravating circumstance
charged is the death of a law enforcement officer during
the course of the officer's duties, the accused need not
be the principal in the first degree. In this case, a
sentence of death may be imposed upon a principal in
the second degree who, (a) willfully, deliberately, and
with premeditation intended the death of the law
enforcement officer, (b) was a major participant in the
29. Richard Danny Tichnell was sentenced to death for the killing of a police officer on
January 18, 1979 during the course of a breaking and entering. After receiving a death
sentence and having it overturned, Tichnell was re-sentenced to life imprisonment on February
6, 1991. This information is contained in the database for this research project. Justice By
Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland 1978-1999
Database (on file with first author). It is also available from the Maryland Office of the Public
Defender, Death Penalty Defense Unit.
30. MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW §§ 2-201-2-202, 2-301, 2-303 (2002).
31. 1987 Md. Laws 626.
32. MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW § 2-202 (b) (2)(i) (2002).
33. 1989 Md. Laws 677.
34. MD. CODE ANN., CRM. LAW § 2-202(b) (2002).
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murder, and (c) was actually present at the time and
place of the murder.
3 5
4. The state's attorney prosecuting the case must
have notified defense counsel at least 30 days in
advance of the trial that the state intends to seek a death
sentence (or a sentence of life without parole) and the
specific aggravating factors that the state intends to rely
on. 3
In addition to the factors named above, at least one of the
following ten statutory aggravating factors must be found by the fact
finder beyond a reasonable doubt.3 These are:
Al. The victim of the murder was a law
enforcement officer in the performance of his/her
duties.
A2. The defendant committed the murder when
confined in a correctional institution.
A3. The defendant committed the murder while
trying to escape from custody.
A4. The victim was taken in the course of a
kidnapping or abduction.
A5. The victim was a child abducted in violation of
§ 3-503 (a) (1) of [the Criminal Law] article,
A6. The defendant murdered pursuant to an
agreement for remuneration.
A7. The defendant employed another who killed for
remuneration.
A8. The defendant committed murder when under
sentence of death or life imprisonment.
A9. The same incident produced multiple murder
victims.
A10. The defendant committed the murder while
committing, or attempting to commit, a carjacking,
armed carjacking, robbery, arson in the first degree,
rape or sexual offense in the first degree.3 8
35. MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (a) (2) (2002).
36. MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (a) (1) (2002).
37. MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 2-202, 2-303(g) (2002).
38. MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(g)(1) (2002).
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The presence of at least one of these statutory aggravators is necessary
to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty,39 but the existence
of one or more of these factors do not require the state's attorney to
seek a death sentence.4 °
In Maryland, State's attorneys have the discretion to not seek a
death sentence even if the defendant is charged with a death-eligible
offense. 4' Moreover, state's attorneys have the discretion to withdraw
a notification to seek a death sentence once filed42 either unilaterally or
in exchange for a plea from a defendant. Further, they have the
discretion to advance a case to a penalty hearing upon a conviction for
capital murder.43 Even if a death sentence is sought by the state, and
the case is advanced to a penalty hearing, the sentencing judge or jury
has the discretion not to impose a death sentence if it feels that capital
punishment is not warranted in a particular case.44 According to
Maryland law, the sentencing body in a capital case must find at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt
before it may consider a death sentence.45 If it does find at least one
aggravating circumstance, and determines that the defendant is eligible
for the death penalty, it must then determine if there are mitigating
circumstances in the case.46 There are eight mitigating factors
enumerated in the Maryland statute that the jury must consider:
MI. The defendant has not previously been
convicted of a crime of violence.
39. MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a) (2002).
40. Maryland prosecutors have historically been given discretion to charge or not charge
a death eligible offense as a capital crime as part of their package of prosecutorial discretion.
See Calhoun v. State, 468 A.2d 45, 63-65 (Md. 1983); Richardson v. State, 598 A.2d l,passim
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), affd, 630 A.2d 238 (Md. 1993).
One of the findings of the current research is that this discretion is regularly
exercised. For example, out of a universe of 1,311 death eligible cases from July 1, 1978 to
December 31, 1999 a notification to seek the death penalty was filed in only 353. See Figure 1
infra p.52.
41. The Maryland Court of Appeals has acknowledged and given approval to the
existence both of considerable prosecutorial discretion in seeking a death sentence and the fact
that there are no explicit standards guiding prosecutorial conduct at the point of deciding to
file a notification to seek death. See Calhoun v. State, 468 A.2d 45, 63-65 (Md. Ct. App.
1983).
42. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-301 (2002).
43. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-301 (2002).
44. Under Maryland law, the jury could simply find that the mitigating factors outweigh
any number of aggravating factors. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(g)-(i) (2002 & Supp.
2003).
45. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(g)(2).
46. MD. CODE ANN., C iM. LAW § 2-303(h)(2).
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M2. The victim participated in the defendant's
conduct or consented to the act that caused the victim's
death.
M3. The defendant acted under substantial duress,
domination, or provocation, but not so substantial as to
constitute a complete defense to the prosecution.
M4. The defendant's capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law was substantially impaired
as a result of mental incapacity, mental disorder, or
emotional disturbance.
M5. The youthful age of the defendant at the time of
the crime.
M6. The act of the defendant was not the sole
proximate cause of the victim's death.
M7. It is unlikely that the defendant will engage in
further criminal activity that would constitute a
continuing threat to society.
M8. Any other facts which the jury or the court
specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as
mitigating circumstances in the case.
With respect to any mitigating circumstances offered by the
defense, each individual juror must determine whether that
circumstance has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.48
If no mitigating factors are found, the presumptive sentence is death.49
If at least one mitigating circumstance is found, then the sentencing
authority must weigh the aggravating circumstances against the
mitigating circumstance. 50  To impose a sentence of death, the
aggravating circumstances must be found to "outweigh" the mitigating
circumstances by "a preponderance of the evidence." 5 1  If the
aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating
circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence, a death sentence
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. The Maryland statute is silent with respect to the mandatory nature of the death
penalty when there are aggravating circumstances found and no factors in mitigation. The
Maryland Court of Appeals has, however, interpreted the statute as requiring the judge or jury
to impose a sentence of death in the presence of aggravators and no mitigators. Scott v. State,
529 A.2d 340, 345 (Md, 1987).
50. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §2-303(i)(1) (2002).
51. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(i)(l)-(2) (2002).
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may not be imposed.52 If the State advised the defendant prior to trial
that it would seek a life without parole sentence, then the court or jury
must decide if the convicted defendant is to be sentenced to a regular
life term or life without parole.53 Any death sentence imposed in the
state of Maryland is subject to automatic appellate review by the
Maryland Court of Appeals. 54 This initial review may not be waived
by a defendant.
55
III. PAST RESEARCH ON THE MARYLAND DEATH PENALTY
Since 1978, there have been four investigations into the
administration of the death penalty in Maryland. Each placed some
emphasis on the issues of racial disparity and arbitrariness (geographic
disparity). In 1987, at the request of the Maryland Court of Appeals,
the Maryland Office of the Public Defender (OPD) collected some
preliminary information on death sentencing patterns in the state from
1978-1987.56 The authors of that study identified 415 homicides that
were deemed to be "death eligible"--meaning facts were presented to
show that those homicides were legally qualified for the death penalty,
ninety of which resulted in a penalty phase hearing. 57 In addition, the
study indicated that the rate at which Maryland State's attorneys filed
death notices substantially varied from county to county. 58 The OPD
also reported that state's attorneys were approximately twice as likely
to file a notification to seek a death sentence and not withdraw that
notification when the homicide victim was white rather than black.59
The OPD report did not, however, consider all possible death eligible
cases such as those that resulted in second-degree murder convictions.
More importantly, the study did not consider the numerous
characteristics about a homicide, such as the number of aggravating
52. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(i)(1)-(2) (2002).
53. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-304(a)(1) (2002).
54. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-401 (2002 & Supp. 2003).
55. The statute describes the review as automatic implying that there is no opportunity
for the defendant to waive their first round of appeals. The automatic nature of this first
review has been interpreted as such by the Court of Appeals. Colvin v. State, 472 A.2d 953,
967 (Md. 1984).
56. MARYLAND OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER - DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE UNIT,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN MARYLAND 1978-1987: A REPORT BY THE MARYLAND PUBLIC
DEFENDER ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987).
57. Id. at 21.
58. Id. at 26-27.
59. Under Maryland law, state's attorneys may withdraw a notification to seek a death
sentence. MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW § 2-301 (2002).
[VOL. 4:1
THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND
factors, the criminal history of the defendant, or the characteristics of
the victim characteristics, which could explain any apparent racial or
geographic disparity.
In 1993, the Governor's Commission on the Death Penalty in
Maryland published its report on the administration of capital
punishment in the state from 1978 to 1993.60 This study examined
death sentences that were actually imposed, penalty phase hearings
that resulted in a life or a life without parole sentence, and death
notifications that were filed but subsequently withdrawn. No data was
collected, however, on such case characteristics as possible non-
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, or the criminal history of
the defendant. The Commission also did not examine all possible
death eligible cases and the manner in which they filtered through the
sentencing system. Given the inadequacies of the data, it is not
surprising that the conclusions were a bit ambiguous. One of the
Commission's findings was that "the data does not establish
discrimination against African American defendants or in favor of
white victims; neither does the data disprove racial discrimination. '" 62
The Commission's report ultimately concluded that "[t]here is no
evidence of intentional discrimination in the implementation of the
death penalty in Maryland, but racial disparities in its implementation
remain a matter of legitimate concern." 63
In 1996, the Task Force on the Fair Imposition of Capital
Punishment (Task Force) was created64 to specifically examine the
issue of racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty
in Maryland.65 The Task Force collected no original data nor did it
complete its own analysis, and limited its examination to the racial
composition of Maryland's then-current death row. It observed that
"[t]he high percentage of African-American prisoners under sentence
of death and the low percentage of prisoners under sentence of death
whose victims were African-American remains a cause for concem." 66
The basis of this conclusion was the finding that of the seventeen
60. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE DEATH PENALTY, THE REPORT OF THE
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE DEATH PENALTY: AN ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
MARYLAND: 1978-1993 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 REPORT].
61. Id. at 201.
62. Id. at 202.
63. Id. at 201.
64. The Task Force on the Fair Imposition of Capital Punishment was created by
Executive Order signed on July 2, 1996 by Governor Parris N. Glendening. Executive Order
01.01.1996.16, 23 Md. Reg. 15, 1162 (July 19, 1996).
65. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE FAIR IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1996).
66. Id. at 39.
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condemned persons then on Maryland's death row, fourteen (82%)
were African American and the victims of the homicides included
sixteen whites and six African-Americans. The Task Force
recommended a more comprehensive empirical study of Maryland's
capital sentencing system.
Finally, in February of 2001, Professors David Baldus and
George Woodworth of the University of Iowa conducted an analysis of
race disparities among 346 Maryland first-degree homicide cases
where the state served notice of its intention to seek the death
penalty.67 They found that, even when considering the number of
statutory aggravating factors charged, defendants who killed white
victims were more likely to advance to a penalty trial and were more
likely to be sentenced to death than those who killed a black victim.
This was particularly true for black offenders who killed white
victims.
The authors acknowledged the two central limitations of their
study: (1) their sample did not include all possible death eligible cases,
(2) and they had limited information on the non-statutory aggravating
and mitigating factors in the case and other case characteristics. With
these limitations in mind, Baldus and Woodworth concluded that
"although our preliminary finding may be construed as supportive of
the disparate treatment hypothesis, a definitive judgment on the issue
must await the results of a study that has better controls for case
severity and defendant culpability than the preliminary results reported
in this report."
68
There have been four previous examinations into the possibility
that there are disparities (either by race, geography or both) in the
administration of the death penalty in Maryland. These four studies
have tried to examine a population of offenders broader than those on
death row, and each has recognized the importance of collecting
detailed information about each case. Each of these previous attempts,
however, has been hampered by the fact that they did not examine all
homicides where death could have been requested, and they all have
failed to collect sufficiently detailed case information about possible
aggravating and mitigating factors and other relevant offense and
offender characteristics. As a result, there is too little empirical
67. David C. Baldus and George Woodworth, Race of Victim and Race of Defendant
Disparities in the Administration of Maryland's Capital Charging and Sentencing System
(1979-1996): Preliminary Finding (Feb. 14, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
68. Id. at 12.
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information upon which to base a conclusion about the fair and even
handed imposition of the death penalty in the state. The purpose of the
present study reported on in this article was to provide the kind of
empirical information needed by the Office of the Governor and state
legislature to determine if race or other suspect factors are influential
in determining which death eligible defendants live and which die.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Sample
We initially examined and screened approximately 6,000 first
and second-degree murders committed in the state of Maryland from
August 1978 (when the state's new death penalty law took effect) until
September 1999. 69 A list of all first and second-degree murderers was
obtained from the Maryland Division of Corrections Research Office
(Maryland Division of Corrections). The data produced consisted of a
computer-generated list of all convicted first and second degree
murderers sentenced to any Maryland correctional institution during
the 1978-1999 time period. The Maryland Division of Corrections
also made available the inmate's institutional record or file, which had
much of the detailed kind of information needed to characterize the
murder, the defendant, and frequently had information on the victim as
well.70 The file contained a great deal of useful information such as a
defendant's criminal history, a pre-sentence report about the
defendant's educational, social, employment, and mental health
history, information about the victim, and a detailed description of the
offense, crime scene, and the type of evidence proffered at trial (for
example, if there was physical evidence available or if the fact-finder
based its assessment on the testimony of an eye-witness). This
information was transcribed onto our initial data collection instrument,
the Maryland Screening Instrument (MDSI).71 From the information
69. The offense dates cover the period from August 1, 1978 until September 25, 1999.
70. The senior investigator entered into a research agreement with the Maryland
Division of Corrections insuring confidentiality with respect to the information extracted from
the inmate files. A similar research agreement was signed with the Maryland Division of
Probation and Parole with specific reference to access to pre-sentence reports and a guarantee
of confidentiality of information.
71. The MDSI was a three-page instrument onto which information was coded
describing each homicide in the database. Included was information that would have provided
evidence supporting the factual existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance (such as the
number of victims killed, whether the victim was a police officer, if the defendant was serving
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in the MDSI we were able to determine for most of the cases whether
or not they were "death eligible." For those cases that were deemed
death eligible, additional, far more extensive information was collected
on each case and transcribed onto the primary data collection
instrument, the Maryland Data Collection Instrument (MDCI). 72
The list produced by the Division of Corrections, and access to
inmate files were important sources of information, but not the only
sources relied on. For cases that both were death eligible and had
advanced to a penalty phase hearing, we examined the court transcript
and the trial judge's report on file with the Clerk of the Maryland
Court of Appeals. An additional source of information was the file on
each case in the office of the state's attorney for the twenty-three
Maryland counties and Baltimore City. In addition to using their files
as a valuable source of information, we sought the assistance of each
of the state's attorneys to both correct and supplement our original list
of cases. We sent a list of homicide cases that the Division of
Corrections had identified as coming from that particular county to
each of the twenty-four state's attorneys. They were asked to verify if
the list was correct and to provide names of any additional murder
defendants who where not on the list, but who had been convicted
during the study's time period of first or second-degree murder. Each
state's attorney was also asked to name any defendants who were
charged with first or second-degree murder, but were subsequently
acquitted or disposed of in ways other than a conviction. The state's
attorneys files provided a substantial amount of very rich information,
which included police reports and the state's version of the case. We
were also able to verify information initially received from other
sources. Information on the homicide victim was also obtained from
the victim's death certificate obtained from the Maryland Office of
Public Health (OPH).
a life sentence at the time of the murder, and if the murder was committed during the
commission of a specified felony like rape, armed robbery or kidnapping). The MDSI also
contained a detailed narrative written by the data collector describing the exact circumstances
surrounding the crime, and any information about the offender and victim obtained in the
record (on file with author).
72. The MDCI was a data collection instrument of over seventy pages onto which
information from the different sources were transcribed by data collectors. It contained
detailed questions about the offense, offender, information for up to four victims, type of
evidence that existed, criminal history questions for both defendant and victim, and
information about the attorneys involved in the case. Information from the MDCI was then
computer coded for analysis. Information sources for the MDCI included police reports, pre-
sentence reports, files of the state's attorney, correctional files, trial transcripts and judge's
reports, and death certificates (on file with author).
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Since one of the decision points examined in this research is
the decision of the state's attorney to seek a death sentence, assuming
that a defendant was eligible for the death penalty, the first task was to
determine which among the universe of murder cases was eligible for
the death penalty. Determining whether or not a murder is death
eligible (i.e., a capital offense) is a controversial issue. In one sense
the only true way to categorize a murder case as eligible for the death
penalty is if a state's attorney determines that the case meets the all of
eligibility requirements as listed in the state statute:
1. The defendant was a principal in the first degree
and the state could prove this beyond a reasonable
doubt, or the defendant fit under the exception to the
principalship requirement,
2. The defendant was not mentally retarded at the
time of the offense (after May of 1989) and the state
could prove this with a preponderance of the evidence,
3. The defendant was not less than 18 years old at
the time of the offense (after June of 1987),
4. The murder also included at least one statutory
aggravating circumstance and the state could prove this
beyond a reasonable doubt, and
5. The state's attorney files a notice 30 days prior
to trial of the state's intention to seek a death sentence,
and the statutory aggravating factors it intends to rely
on.
73
Clearly, a murder case that meets these statutory eligibility
requirements and is followed by the state's attorney also formally
filing a notice to seek a death sentence, is death eligible and should be
treated as such. However, a homicide may also meet the first four of
these requirements, but the state's attorney may decide not to seek a
death sentence for other reasons. The reasons may include the
potential cost of the case to the county, the reluctance of the victim's
family to support a death sentence, a low probability that a jury would
return a death sentence in the eyes of the state's attorney. In this
instance, a homicide that was technically "death eligible," in that it fit
all the statutory requirements as being a capital case would not be
followed by a decision to seek a death sentence, and the case would be
73. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2002).
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handled as a non-capital homicide. In addition, different state's
attorneys in different offices (or even different state's attorneys within
the same office) may evaluate a case as to its death eligibility and
come to a different conclusion. The issue of first-degree principalship,
for instance, is not always easy to determine and different state's
attorneys may disagree as to whether or not principalship exists, or if it
does exist, whether it could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Similar ambiguity may exist with respect to the presence in a murder
of a statutory aggravating circumstance, or if the aggravating
circumstance could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or if the
available mitigating evidence would in the minds of the jury outweigh
the aggravating circumstance. There are no automatic or indisputable
answers to these issues; they are inherently ambiguous.
Some murder cases,, therefore, may be "death eligible" in the
sense that they meet all of the statutory criteria for death eligibility,
and yet the state's attorney does not treat the case as such and does not
file a formal notification to seek death. If one is interested, as we are
here, in examining the factors that explain the state's attorneys'
decision to seek death in some death eligible cases but not others, there
is a need to define a death eligible case in ways other than the filing of
a formal notice to seek death. We proceeded with caution, however,
because the issue as to whether or not a murder case is death eligible
involves a great deal of ambiguity and inevitable controversy.
For the purpose of this research, we defined a case to be death
eligible if:
1. The state's attorney filed a notice of an intention
to seek a death sentence, even if that notice was later
withdrawn unilaterally or in exchange for a plea.
2. The facts of the case clearly established that a
first-degree murder was committed, the defendant was
the principal in the first degree (or met the principle in
the second-degree exception), the defendant was
eligible by age at the time of the offense, the defendant
was not mentally retarded at the time of the offense,
and the murder included at least one statutory
aggravating circumstance.
From an initial pool of approximately 6,000 homicides, these
two criteria produced a universe of 1,311 death eligible cases. Initially
included in the universe of 6,000 homicides was a pool of
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approximately 300 homicide cases where the state's attorney did not
file a notification to seek a death sentence and the issue of death
eligibility based upon the available facts of the case was ambiguous to
the research team. In these cases, it was not clear if the defendant was
the principal in the first degree in the killing, or if there was a statutory
aggravating circumstance present to make the homicide death eligible.
In order to determine death eligibility in these cases we submitted
them for review to a panel of attorneys who had experience in death
penalty cases. This panel consisted of a roughly equal number of
state's attorneys, public defenders, and private lawyers who have
handled death penalty cases as former prosecutors, public defenders or
as private defense counsel.
74
Panel members read narratives of each homicide in question
that were prepared by the research staff as part of the MDSI. These
narratives presented the facts of the case and all known information
about the offender and victim. Panel attorneys were asked to read the
narrative in each of these suspect cases and were asked to make two
determinations:
1. Do you think this case is "death eligible" under
Maryland law? With response options, "yes" or no'.
2. On a scale from 1 ("not very confident at all") to
10 ("very confident") how confident do you feel in
making this determination?
Each case was read and rated by a group of panel attorneys.
75
We included as death eligible those homicides where a majority of
panel attorneys rated the case as death eligible and where the
confidence of the rating averaged 5.0 or higher. In other words, a
majority of the reviewing panel had to rate the case as death eligible
and they had to state that they were at least moderately confident in
making that assessment. Out of the approximately 300 cases reviewed
by the panel of attorneys, fewer than fifty were determined to be death
eligible and were added to the pool of death eligible cases.
Our universe of cases includes the 1,311 death eligible cases in
Maryland from July 1, 1978 to December 31, 1999, and we illustrate
74. A majority of the lawyers on the panel requested that their participation be kept
strictly confidential.
75. For each case reviewed, the number of panel attorneys ranged from 5 to 10.
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the number of cases at each decision point in Figure 1.76 Out of these
1,311 death eligible cases (Stage 1), state's attorneys filed a formal
notification to seek the death penalty in 353 (Stage 2). As can be seen
from this figure, state's attorneys frequently exercise their discretion
not to file a capital charge even though the facts of the case would
warrant it. Although 353 notifications to seek death were filed, 140
were subsequently withdrawn by the state's attorney either unilaterally
or most often (in approximately 90% of these cases) in exchange for a
plea from the defendant. A death notification filed by the state's
attorney was retained or "stuck" in 213 cases (Stage 3). Of these 213
cases where a death notification was filed and not withdrawn, 180
were advanced to a penalty trial (Stage 4). A case would not be
advanced to a penalty trial for a number of reasons: the state
determines that it is unlikely to obtain a death sentence and unilaterally
decides not to advance a case, there were no aggravators found during
the guilt phase, or the defendant was found not to have been a
principal in the first degree. From 180 penalty trials, a death sentence
was obtained in 76 cases (Stage 5).77
From Figure 1, we can calculate some very simple probabilities
that will provide the risk that an offender will pass through each step
of the capital punishment process. First, let us take all death eligible
cases. The unconditional probability that the state's attorney would
file a formal notification to seek the death penalty among all death
eligible cases is .27 (353/1,311). In other words, given the existence
of a case that was eligible for the death penalty by statute, state
prosecutors exercised their discretion and filed a formal notification to
seek death in only slightly more than one-quarter of them. The
unconditional probability that the state's attorney would not withdraw
the notification to seek a death sentence among all death eligible cases
is .16 (213/1,311). The unconditional probability that the case would
be advanced to a penalty trial is .14 (180/1,311). Finally, the
unconditional probability of a death sentence among all death eligible
cases is .058 (76/1,311). In other words, out of a pool of 1,311 death
eligible cases, a sentence of death was handed down by a judge or jury
only about 6% of the time.
76. The data contained in this paper are slightly different from those used in the final
report on this project. This is because some race of the offender and race of victim
information, which was missing in the original final report were found and were able to be
included in the database for the analyses reported in this paper. None of the substantive
conclusions changed from the final project report to this paper.
77. Seventy-six death sentences were imposed on fifty-nine different defendants. An
implication of this is that the same offender could appear in the database more than once.
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Now, let us examine the conditional probability of a case being
advanced to each successive stage of the capital punishment process.
We know that the probability that the state's attorney will file a formal
notification to seek a death sentence given the fact that it is death
eligible is .27 (353/1,311). The conditional probability that a state's
attorney will not withdraw a notification to seek a death sentence
given that one was filed was .61 (215/353). Once a death notification
is filed, it is retained or not withdrawn 61% of the time. Given the fact
that a notification to seek death was not withdrawn, the conditional
probability that the state's attorney will advance the case to a penalty
trial is .84 (180/215). Finally, given the fact that a case is advanced to
the penalty phase, the probability that a death sentence was imposed
by a judge or jury is .42 (76/180). Even among the subgroup of cases
where there is the second phase of a capital trial (the penalty phase),
judges and juries impose a sentence of death in less than half of the
cases 42%.
B. Analytic Strategy of the Current Research
Although the substantive issue in this study is the effect of race
and geography, each of the four decision making points in the
Maryland capital sentencing system is influenced by many homicide
case characteristics that we have captured in our data collection
instrument-MDCI, including the number of statutory and non-
statutory aggravating circumstances and the presence of factors in
mitigation. The key inferential task is to examine whether race or
geography has any material affect on each of these decision points
after carefully considering or "controlling for" these case
characteristics. We will examine the role that race and geography may
play at four critical points in the Maryland capital sentencing system
while simultaneously considering important features of a case that
make it more or less deserving of a capital charge, a penalty phase
hearing, or a death sentence. In trying to determine the impact of
factors such as race and geography, it is critical that these numerous
case characteristics be considered. As we have argued in the
introduction, such characteristics are inevitably confounded both with
the variables of substantive interest (race and geography) and with the
outcome variable we are interested in (the four decision making points
we focus on). Our methodological task is to "purge" our
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race/geography variables of all reasonable legitimate case
characteristics that may affect any given decision point.
Suppose, for example, there is a finding that black offenders
are treated more severely than white offenders at some decision point
in the capital sentencing process. We observe any "race of the
offender" disparity for one or both of two reasons: (1) black offenders
really are at a disadvantage and receive disparate treatment, or (2)
black offenders or the offenses committed by black offenders are more
likely to have the characteristics that incline prosecutors to seek the
death penalty.78 From an inferential perspective, therefore, it is critical
that as many characteristics or factors of a case be considered or
"controlled" in order to distinguish the effect of race from the effect of
legally relevant factors that may be associated or correlated with race.
There is a direct analogy between estimating a race or
geography effect and determining the effect of smoking on lung
cancer. People are not randomly assigned to smoke or not smoke.
People who smoke, therefore, are systematically different from those
who do not-they may live more sedentary lives or have less healthy
diets, etc. When a researcher is looking at the effect of smoking on
lung cancer, therefore, they must also consider other characteristics
that distinguish smokers and non-smokers, which increase their risk of
lung cancer besides the fact that they smoke. What public health
researchers strive to do, therefore, is to compare lung cancer rates
between smokers and non-smokers who are "alike" on such factors as
how well they eat, how sedentary their life styles are, their family
history of cancer, where they live, and other important factors that are
also related to the risk of lung cancer. Researchers do this so that any
observed differences in lung cancer rates between smokers and non-
smokers can be attributed to smoking and not some other experience,
event, or characteristic that is simply correlated with smoking.
Our inferential problem is the same within the context of this
study. To isolate the effect of race or geography, we need to identify
and consider differences among offenders of different races, and
offenders who murder whites versus non-whites, or who live in
Montgomery versus Baltimore County. We will do this by directly
78. For example, they have more extensive criminal histories, or commit their crimes in
a more brutal/egregious manner.
79. See PAUL R. ROSENBAUM, OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES, 1-5, 112-14 (Springer 2d ed.
2002).
80. We are interested in three types of race variables, the race of the offender (white
versus non-white offender), the race of the victim (white versus non-white victim), and the
combination of race of offender and race of victim (whites who murder whites, whites who
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incorporating into our statistical model factors that we find to be
empirically related to the geography and race variables. A list of the
potential explanatory factors used in our modeling is provided in Table
1. There are 112 possible factors or case characteristics used for the
decision to file a notification to seek the death penalty for which we
have collected data. For decisions beyond the notice to file stage-
the decision to withdraw the notification, decision to advance a case to
the penalty phase, and the sentencing decision-we supplemented this
covariate list with 11 additional case characteristics based on the
presence of statutory aggravating circumstances found in the charging
document. 8' These additional case factors are shown at the bottom of
Table 1.
Our procedures for incorporating these case characteristics into
the multivariate models were as follows: At each decision point we
first examined each case characteristic listed in Table 1 separately to
see if it was related to the geography or race variable of interest." For
the death notice and death sentence imposed outcomes with the
universe of death eligible cases, those factors that were significantly
related at the .05 statistical level were retained for further analysis,
those not meeting that criterion were dropped. For the analyses that
condition on a subset of the universe of death eligible cases we used a
less stringent criterion of statistical significance (p <. 10) 83 since the
samples sizes were so much smaller for these analyses. The variables
that were retained at this first screening were then entered into a full
logistic regression model with the particular decision point as the
outcome variable, and a test for county and race differences conducted.
The case characteristic variables from the full model that were not
significant at (p < .10) were then dropped and a reduced model was
estimated. The parameter estimates of the reduced model are reported
in each table in our results section discussed below along with a
murder non-whites, non-whites who murder whites, and non-whites who murder non-whites).
Our geographic variable includes the jurisdictions covered by the twenty-four state's attorneys
in Maryland-twenty-three counties and Baltimore City.
81. The charging document is a form filled out by the office of the state's attorney that
lists each charge filed against a given defendant. On this document, the state's attorney lists
the specific aggravating factors that will be charged and pursued at trial.
82. We pursued this multiple stage approach to the analysis rather than entering the
more than 100 case characteristics into our model in order to avoid the problem of "overfittng"
the data-having too many variables in the statistical model relative to the number of
observations.
83. For example: cases where the notification to seek death was not withdrawn, cases
that are advanced to a penalty trial given that the death notice was not withdrawn and cases
where a sentence of death was imposed given that there was a penalty trial.
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statistical test for the difference between the full and reduced model.
In every case, the reduced model was not significantly different from
the full model.84 The parameter estimates reported in each table are
those from the reduced model.
V. RESULTS
A. Unadjusted Analysis
We began our empirical examination by conducting basic
descriptive analyses of county and race patterns at each of the four key
decision points in the Maryland death penalty sentencing system.
First, the prosecutor's decision to issue a notice of intention to seek the
death penalty to a death eligible defendant. In 353 cases, the
prosecutor issued a notice and in the remaining 958 cases no notice
was filed). Second, the prosecutor's decision to either withdraw or
"stick" with a death notification among the 353 death-notified cases.
In 213 of these cases the prosecutor stuck with the notice and in the
remaining 140 the prosecutor retracted the death notice. Third, a
decision by the prosecutor to have the case proceed to a penalty trial
among the 213 cases where the death notification was not withdrawn.
In 180 instances, the case advanced to a penalty trial while in the
remaining 33 it did not. Fourth, the decision to actually impose a
death sentence. In 180 penalty trials, a sentence of death was imposed
76 times, and in 104 trials, a sentence other than death was imposed.
Figures 2-5 and Tables 2-5 present a number of key descriptive
statistics associated with the Maryland death penalty system.
1. Race
Basic descriptive information for the race of the offender is
shown in Figure 2. This figure shows that white offenders comprise
about .24 of the pool of death eligible cases, black offenders .74 and
offenders of other races .02. The contribution of white offenders
increases slightly at the next stage-the decision to file a death
notification-where .34 of all offenders who are charged with a capital
crime are white and the proportion of black offenders declines slightly
84. Since the reduced model is nested (a subset of) under the full model, the test for the
statistical difference between them is simply calculated as the difference in the chi-square
statistic between them, with the degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of
parameters estimated in the two models.
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to .65. After the decision to file a notification to seek death, the
proportion of white and black offenders who do not have their death
notification withdrawn by the state's attorney (Stage 3), and who are
advanced to a penalty trial (Stage 4) remains fairly constant. There is
a slight increase in the proportion of black offenders who are
sentenced to death from .64 of those advanced to a penalty phase to
.68 of those sentenced to death; and a corresponding decline among
white offenders from .35 of those advanced to a penalty phase to .32 of
those sentenced to death.
Table 2 reports the rate at which offender race groups are
processed through the Maryland death penalty system. The probability
that a death notification will be filed given a death eligible case is .24
for black offenders, and .37 for non-black offenders (over 90% of
whom are white). At this first decision point and without taking into
account case characteristics, then, non-black offenders are significantly
more likely to have a death notice filed against them than are black
offenders. At each subsequent stage of the process there are no
statistically significant differences in the handling of black offender
and non-black offender cases.
Figure 3 reports the proportion of white victim and non-white
victim cases at each stage of the death penalty system. White victims
comprise approximately .44 of all death eligible cases. At each
subsequent stage of the process, however, the proportion of white
victim cases increases. White victim homicides make up .66 of those
cases where a death notification is filed, .74 of the cases where a death
notification "sticks," .77 of the cases that are advanced to a penalty
trial and .80 of the death sentences imposed in Maryland during this
period. Correspondingly, the representation of cases with non-white
victims consistently declines at each successive stage of the system
from approximately .57 of all death eligible cases to about .20 of those
where a sentence of death is imposed. These unadjusted figures
suggest that there is a filtering of white victim cases into and non-
white victim cases out of the Maryland capital punishment system.
We do not know, however, to what extent this selective filtering is due
to differences in case characteristics between white and non-white
victim cases or whether it reflects racial bias.
Table 3 reports the unadjusted rate at which white and non-
white victim cases are processed through the system. The probability
that a state's attorney will file a notification to seek the death penalty
in a death eligible case is .42 when there is at least one white victim
and .17 when there are no white victims. This difference in these
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statistics is significant in this study. State's attorneys are also
significantly more likely to retain a death notification once filed in
white victim cases compared with non-white victim cases (.69 versus
.46). The probability that a case will be advanced to a penalty trial is
also significantly higher in white victim (.88) than non-white victim
(.75) cases. There is no race of victim disparity when the decision is
whether to sentence someone to death given a penalty trial (.44 for
white victim cases and .37 for non-white victim cases). Overall,
however, the probability of a death sentence given the fact that a case
is death eligible is higher in white victim compared with non-white
victim cases (.11 versus .02), a statistically significant difference.
These unadjusted figures suggest that the race of the victim appears to
matter at least in the early stages of the capital punishment system.
State's attorneys are more likely to seek a death sentence and less
likely to withdraw a death notification when a white victim is killed,
and this disparate impact is filtered down to the sentencing stage-
those who kill a white victim are over five times more likely to be
sentenced to death than are those who kill non-whites.
85
Figure 4 provides the distribution of combinations of
offender's and victim's race at various stages of the Maryland capital
punishment system. There are two clear patterns from this figure. The
first is that the proportion of cases involving a black offender and a
white victim increases dramatically as a defendant move further into
the process (from Stage 1 to Stage 5). The other is that the proportion
of cases involving a black offender and a black victim consistently
declines from charging a defendant with murder to the sentencing
phase. For example, black-on-white homicides comprise about .23 of
all death eligible cases, but .35 of those where the state's attorney files
a notification to seek a death sentence, .40 of those where the death
notification "sticks," .43 of the penalty trials and one-half of the death
sentences imposed. The proportion of cases involving a black
offender who killed at least one white victim, more than doubles from
Stage 1 (death eligible cases; p=.225) to Stage 5 (death sentenced
cases; p=.500). Killings involving a black offender and a black victim
make up .49 of the total number of death eligible cases, but only .28 of
the death notifications, .22 of the notifications that "stick,". 19 of the
penalty trials, and only .18 of the 76 death sentences. In other words,
the proportion of cases involving a non-white offender and non-white
85. We would caution the reader that sometimes the "times more likely" phrase is used
is situations where there is a low base rate. The hurdle for getting a larger "times more likely"
number is lower when the base rates are lower than when they are higher.
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victim is reduced by more than one-half from Stage 1 to Stage 5. The
proportion of homicides involving white offenders and white victims
also increases at each successive stage of the process, but not as
dramatically as we observed for black-on-white killings.
Tables 4A to 4D report the rate at which various race of
offender/victim groups are processed at each decision point in the
Maryland capital sentencing system. Table 4A shows that homicides
involving white offenders and white victims are significantly more
likely than all other racial combinations to result in a formal
notification to seek the death penalty (.41 versus .25). White-on-white
killings are not treated significantly different from other cases at any
other stage of the process. However, because of the different rate at
which the prosecutor seeks death in these cases (Stage 1), white
defendants who kill at least one white victim are more likely to be
sentenced to death compared to all other racial combinations (.09
versus .06).
Table 4B shows the rate at which black-on-black killings are
processed. Compared with the other racial groups, black offenders
who kill blacks are significantly less likely to have a death notification
filed (.16 in black on black killings versus .41 in all others), and less
likely to have the notification "stick" (.47 in black on black killings
versus .66 in all others). There is no difference at the stage of
advancing a case to a penalty trial or the rate of death sentencing given
that a penalty trial occurs. The unconditional probability of a death
sentence in a death eligible case is, however, significantly lower for
black-on-black killings compared with all other racial groups (.02
versus .10), and this is because of the differential treatment of these
cases in the hands of prosecutors.
Table 4C reports the rate of processing cases involving black
offenders and white victims. State's attorneys in Maryland are
significantly more likely to file a formal notification to seek the death
penalty in black-on-white killings compared with other racial
combinations (.45 versus .24). They are also significantly more likely
not to withdraw a death notification once filed in exchange for a plea
bargain when a black offender murders a white victim (.69 for black
on white killings versus .56 for all other racial combinations). Black
offenders that kill whites are not treated significantly different at the
decision to advance a case to a penalty trial or the sentencing decision
given that fact that there is a penalty trial. The unconditional
probability of a death sentence is higher in black-on-white killings that
are death eligible, however, (. 14 in black on white killings versus .04
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in all others) because of decisions made by state's attorneys earlier in
the process-the decision to file a death notification, and not to
withdraw a death notification once filed).
Table 4D reports the processing of white-on-black homicides.
While whites that kill blacks are significantly more likely to be death
notified than other racial combinations (.50 versus .28), not much
weight should be given to these results since there were only 22 cases
involving white offenders and black victims. This diminishes to only
3 white killing black cases at the penalty phase and only 1 such case at
the sentencing stage.
2. Geography
Figure 5 presents the distribution of cases for several Maryland
jurisdictions at each stage of the capital punishment process. Two
findings stand out from the data collected pertaining to geography.
First, the proportion of cases from Baltimore City declines
substantially from Stage 1 (death eligibility) to Stage 5 (death
sentencing). Second, the proportion of cases from Baltimore County
increases substantially from Stage 1 to Stage 5. Baltimore City
homicides comprise .44 of all death eligible homicides, but only .10
of the death notifications, only .11 of the death notifications that are
not withdrawn, .10 of the penalty trials, and only .13 of the death
sentences. Baltimore County homicides comprise only. 12 of all death
eligible homicides in the state but .28 of all death notifications, .39 of
all notifications that "stick," .42 of all penalty trials, and .45 of all
death sentences. Baltimore County, therefore, which only contributed
12% to the total number death eligible homicides in the state from
1978-1999, was responsible for almost one-half of the total number of
death sentences that were imposed.
Table 4 reports the processing of cases at each decision making
point for these same jurisdictions. There is statistically significant
variation across these jurisdictions in the probability that a death
eligible case will result in a notification to seek a death sentence by the
state's attorney. This probability is .65 for Baltimore County, .54 for
Harford County, .38 for Prince George's County, .23 for Anne
Arundel County, .19 for Montgomery County, .06 for Baltimore City,
and .46 for other counties in Maryland. There is also statistically
significant jurisdictional variation in the rate at which death
notifications once filed are retained or withdrawn, from a high of .84
in Baltimore County to a low of .40 in Prince George's County. There
is no significant variation by jurisdiction in the decision to advance a
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case to a penalty trial stage or in the decision to impose a sentence of
death at the penalty trial phase. However, there is statistically
significant variation across the different jurisdictions in the probability
of a death sentence for all death eligible cases, due to the way the
charging decisions are handled by different state's attorneys offices.
The unconditional probability of a death sentence in Baltimore County
is 12 times higher than in adjacent Baltimore City (.224 versus .018).
Death sentencing rates are highest in Baltimore (.224), Harford (.086),
and Anne Arundel (.063) Counties; and the lowest in Baltimore City
(.018), Montgomery (.034), and Prince George's (.035) County. In
sum, our unadjusted analysis would suggest the following:
1. White offenders are more likely to be death
notified than non-white offenders.
2. Offenders who kill at least one white victim are
more likely to be death notified, more likely to have
that notification "stick," and more likely to be advanced
to a penalty trial than cases without a white victim.
3. White offenders who kill whites are more likely
to be death notified than others.
4. Black offenders who kill blacks are less likely to
be death notified and have that notification "stick" than
others.
5. Black offenders who kill whites are more likely
to be death notified and have that notification "stick."
6. There is substantial and significant variation in
the way different state's attorneys in Maryland make
the decision to file a notification to seek the death
penalty and whether or not that notification is
withdrawn.
While we have found substantial disparate treatment by race
and geography in the processing of cases in the Maryland death
penalty system, this unadjusted analysis does not take into account
numerous facts/circumstances about these homicides that may
legitimately explain this disparate treatment. We now proceed to
examine what happens to this evidence of disparate treatment by race
and geography once legitimate case characteristics are taken into
account.
2004]
MARGINS
B. Adjusted Analysis
Professors David Baldus and George Woodworth of the
University of Iowa have previously examined offender and victim race
data for the subset of death noticed cases in Maryland.86  A key
recommendation emerging from their report was that a study
controlling for other variables in addition to the statutory aggravating
factors would provide more definitive answers to questions about the
Maryland system.8 7 The goal of the adjusted analysis was to examine
geographic as well as victim and offender race disparities in Maryland
after controlling for a wide variety of relevant individual case
characteristics (those listed in Table 1). Unfortunately, there was no
information on some of the covariates for some of the cases.
Consequently, it is necessary to attain a balance between including as
many cases as possible with as many explanatory variables or
covariates as possible. It is not possible to optimize both of these
quantities simultaneously - an increase in the number of cases
necessitates a loss of some of the covariates and an increase in the
number of covariates necessitates a loss of some of the cases.
After examining a variety of different possibilities, a list of
variables with complete data on 1,202 of the original 1,311 cases
(91.7% of the original number) was devised. A comparison of the
notice rates and death sentence rates for the dropped cases compared
to the included cases reveals that they are not significantly different
(p(drop I notice) = .074 compared to p(drop I not noticed) = 0.087; X2(I)
= 0.571; p > .05 and p(drop I death sentence) = 0.066 compared to
p(drop I no death sentence) = 0.084; X2() = 0.3 19; p > .05).88
The race of victim and race of defendant variables had
additional missing data problems. There were 18 additional cases with
missing offender race information yielding a sample of 1,202 - 18 =
1,184 cases for race of offender analyses. There were 54 cases with
missing victim race information yielding a sample of 1,202 - 54 =
86. David C. Baldus and George Woodworth, Race of Victim and Race of Defendant
Disparities in the Administration of Maryland's Capital Charging and Sentencing System
(1979-1996): Preliminary Finding (Feb. 14, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
87. Id.atlO-11.
88. To address the impact of losing these cases on the results, a series of analyses was
conducted. On balance, these data reveal very little change in any of the basic descriptive
quantities presented earlier. This evidence suggests (but does not prove) that the missing
cases are a relatively representative sample of the universe of death eligible cases. The
descriptive data and unadjusted analyses with the reduced sample are available from the
authors upon request.
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1,148 cases for race of victim analyses. Finally, to analyze the
intersection of victim and offender race, an additional 72 cases were
lost yielding a sample of 1,202 - 72 = 1,130 cases.
Table 1 presents the list of covariates used in the study. The
first set of covariates in this table were observed for the full 1,202
cases, while the second set were measures of statutory aggravating
factors which were only observed for the 327 cases that were death
noticed (26 cases out of the original 353 death noticed cases were lost
to missing data as described above). Most of the entries in Table 1 are
proportions, meaning that they can be interpreted as the number of
cases having the characteristic divided by the total number of cases.
The total number of cases is 1,202, except for the statutory aggravating
factors where the total number of cases is 327.
1. Adjusted Analysis: Between-Jurisdiction Variation
First, we will present the results for jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction
variation because as we will discuss in some detail later, jurisdiction
will impact the "race effect." Tables 6A-6F present the details of a
multiple-variable logistic regression analysis of county processing
patterns at different stages of the death penalty system in Maryland.
Our purpose in this analysis is to examine whether the jurisdiction
where the crime occurred and where the defendant was charged has an
effect on our four decision making points, after considering relevant
case characteristics. 89 Table 6A reports the results for the decision of
the state's attorney to file a notification to seek the death penalty. The
parameter estimates for the case characteristics are given in Table 6A,
along with the estimated effects for each county. We also report a
Type III chi-square statistical test that the addition of the county
variables as a block significantly increases the log-likelihood of the
model. This chi-square test (X2 = 191.92 with 6 degrees of freedom; p
< .05) shows that there is significant jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction
variation in the way the decision to file a death notification is handled.
Compared to the reference category, state's attorneys in Anne Arundel
County, Baltimore City and Montgomery County are significantly less
likely to file a notification to seek the death penalty, while cases in
Baltimore County are significantly more likely to be death notified. It
89. We will not interpret the coefficients for the case characteristics in this paper
because our interest in them is purely statistical. We know that there are characteristics of the
homicide that are related both to the outcome variable of interest (in the case of Table 6A, the
prosecutor's charging decision) and our geography and race variables. In order to determine
the effect of geography and race, we need to statistically control for these homicide
characteristics variables in our statistical models.
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is important to note that this substantial variation by legal jurisdiction
in the state's attorneys' decision to seek a death sentence exists even
after controlling for numerous case characteristics.
Table 6B reports the results of the decision to not withdraw a
death notification once filed. Again, there is substantial and
statistically significant variation across legal jurisdictions in Maryland
in the decision to withdraw a death notification (X2 = 26.97 with 6
degrees of freedom; p < .05). State's attorneys in Baltimore County
are more likely to have a death notification once filed "stick"
compared to the reference category "other counties" made up of all
other Maryland counties excluding Anne Arundel, Harford,
Montgomery, and Prince George's. Baltimore City, Anne Arundel
County, Harford County, Montgomery County and Prince George's
County are not significantly different from the "other counties" in the
state in withdrawing death notifications. In examining Table 6C there
is no longer a significant jurisdiction effect (X2 = 4.00 with 6 degrees
of freedom; p > .05). This means that in terms of the decision by the
state's attorney to advance a case to a penalty trial among the group of
death eligible cases where the notification to seek death is not
withdrawn, there is no significant variation across the different legal
jurisdictions in Maryland. Table 6D reports the results for the decision
to impose a death sentence given that a penalty trial occurs. Although
the overall chi-square test for the county variables s not significant (X2
= 8.77 with 6 degrees of freedom; p > .05), there is a marginally
significant jurisdictional effect with cases from Baltimore County
more likely to be sentenced to death given that a penalty trial occurs,
even after case characteristics are considered. Table 6E reports the
logistic regression analysis of whether a defendant receives a death
sentence given the fact that it is a death eligible case. The results
again show a significant effect for the charging jurisdiction (X2 = 56.37
with 6 degrees of freedom; p < .05). Net of case characteristics, death
eligible defendants in Baltimore City and Prince George's County are
significantly less likely on average to be sentenced to death while
those in Baltimore County are significantly more likely on average to
be sentenced to death. The reason for this considerable variation is the
different rate at which prosecutors in the different locations in the state
make capital charges (Table 6A).
To provide an easy way to interpret the magnitude of the
county effect at each decision making point, the predicted probability
of each outcome both before (unadjusted) and after (adjusted) the
statistical control for case characteristics is reported for each
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jurisdiction in Table 6F.90 Looking at the decision to file a death
notification, we can see that the predicted probability that a death
notice will be filed in a death eligible case ranges from a high of (.620)
in Baltimore County to a low of (.046) in Baltimore City. Given the
fact that a death eligible homicide has occurred, the probability that a
notification to seek death will be filed in Baltimore County is over 13
times higher than in adjacent Baltimore City, even after taking into
account important case characteristics. The probability of being death
notified if a case is in Baltimore County is over five times greater than
if it occurred in Montgomery County and three times greater than if it
occurred in Anne Arundel County. The probability that the state's
attorney willfile a formal notification to seek death in Harford County
is more than ten times higher than in Baltimore City, and four times
greater than in Montgomery County. The substantial jurisdiction-to-
jurisdiction variation in the probability of a death notice given a death
eligible offense is statistically significant.
There is also substantial variation across the different Maryland
jurisdictions in the probability that a death notice once filed will
"stick". This probability is highest in Baltimore County (p=.857),
Anne Arundel County (p=.783), and Baltimore City (p=.648) and
lowest in Prince George's County (p=.468). These jurisdictional
variations are also statistically significant. In looking at the
probability that a case will be advanced to a penalty trial or will be
sentenced to death after a penalty trial, the variation by jurisdiction
becomes much smaller and is not statistically significant. It is easy to
see from Table 5F that the probability of these latter two decisions is
fairly consistent across the different jurisdictions in the states.
The effect of early prosecutorial decisions on later stages of the
capital sentencing process can be seen in the unconditional probability
of a death sentence. The last column of Table 6F reports the adjusted
probability of a death sentence for all death eligible cases. There is
significant jurisdictional variation in the decision to impose a death
sentence for a death eligible homicide that is unexplained by case
characteristics. The unconditional probability of a death sentence
among death eligible cases is twenty-three times higher in Baltimore
90. These predicted probabilities were determined after setting each covariate at the
sample mean. This does not, of course, ensure that we have a "typical" case, just that the
hypothetical offenders have equal values set at the sample mean on each of the covariates.
This approach is simply one method for comparing two hypothetical offenders who have
covariate values at the sample means. The choice of other covariate values would change the
"times more likely" interpretation because changing the covariate values would change the
expected base rate of the outcome.
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County than it is in Baltimore City, even after considering case
characteristics. This difference is all the more striking because
Baltimore County and Baltimore City are adjacent jurisdictions in
Maryland. The probability of a death sentence in Baltimore County is
almost 14 times higher than it is in Montgomery County and eight
times higher than in Prince George's County. The probability of a
death sentence in Anne Arundel and Harford Counties is almost five
times greater than it is in Montgomery County and nearly three times
higher than in Prince George's County.
What these results clearly indicate is that the jurisdiction where
the homicide occurs and where the defendant is charged matters a
great deal. There are large differences in how different legal
jurisdictions process their death penalty cases in Maryland. Our
research clearly indicates that these differences are manifested in how
state's attorneys charge death eligible cases and whether they retain a
capital charge or decide to withdraw it. Although the jurisdictional
differences occur early in the process at the decisions made by local
prosecutors, they are propagated to later points and go uncorrected.
It is also important to note that the variation in how death cases are
handled in the different legal jurisdictions in Maryland found in the
previously reported unadjusted analysis holds up in the multivariate
analysis when numerous case characteristics are considered. In other
words, the differences in how different jurisdictions handle death
eligible cases cannot be attributed to the kinds of homicides committed
in those jurisdictions.
2. Adjusted Analysis: Offender's Race
Tables 7A to 7F report the results of a multivariate logistic
regression analysis looking at the race of the offender at various stages
of Maryland's death sentencing process after controlling for both case
characteristics and charging county.91  Looking across the different
decision points, there is no evidence that the race of the defendant
matters at any stage once case characteristics and jurisdiction are
controlled. Table 7A shows that state's attorneys are more likely to
file a formal notification to seek a death sentence against black
91. As we will discuss later in the study, it is necessary to control for county effects as
well as relevant case characteristics because the race variables are confounded with county.
There is substantial variation across Maryland jurisdictions in the proportion of death eligible
homicides that are black defendant, white victim, and black defendant with white victim cases.
The failure to control for county in our multiple logistic regression models would mean that
effects on the dependent variable that are due to the omitted county variable would be
attributed in part to the race variable.
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offenders, but the effect is not statistically significant. In the decisions
not to withdraw a death notification (Table 7B), to advance a case to a
penalty trial (Table 7C), to impose a death sentence among the subset
of penalty trial cases (Table 7D), or to impose a death sentence among
the universe of all death eligible case (Table 7E), the effect of the
offender's race is substantively trivial and not significantly different
from zero. The absence of any appreciable effect for the offender's
race on any of the four decision making points in the Maryland capital
sentencing system can best be seen in Table 7F, which reports
predicted probabilities for black and non-black offenders both before
and after considering case characteristics and the charging jurisdiction.
The largest difference in probabilities occurs at the decision to impose
a death sentence given a penalty trial. There, the probability that a
black offender will be sentenced to death is .444 and the probability
for non-black offenders is .376, a statistically non-significant
difference of .068. In sum, we have found no evidence that the race of
the defendant by itself matters in the processing of capital cases in
Maryland.
3. Victim's Race
In Tables 8A to 8G we report race of victim patterns at various
stages of Maryland's death penalty system. Recall that in the
unadjusted analysis offenders committing murders of white victims
were significantly more likely to be death noticed, to have that death
notification "stick," to be advanced to a penalty trial than those who
killed non-black victims, and to be sentenced to death given that a case
was death eligible (Table 3). In the adjusted (multivariate) analysis,
we find that this difference in the handling of black victim and non-
black victim cases is reduced but cannot entirely be explained by the
case characteristics of the homicide or the charging jurisdiction. Table
8A shows that even after case factors and jurisdictional differences are
taken into account, those who kill whites are still significantly more
likely to have the state's attorney file a notification to seek the death
penalty. The logistic regression coefficient for victim's race is .669
which means that the odds that the state's attorney will file a formal
notification to seek death is almost twice as high when a white victim
is murdered than when a non-white is murdered.92 Table 8B reveals
92. The "odds multiplier" for a logistic regression coefficient can be found by taking the
anti-log or exponent of the logistic coefficient. It is important to keep in mind that the odds
multiplier indicates the change in odds of the dependent variable occurring, and is not a
probability (an odds is the ratio of two probabilities, the probability of an event occurring over
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that the decision not to withdraw a death notification is also related to
the race of the victim. After considering jurisdiction and case
characteristics, state's attorneys are significantly less likely to
withdraw a death notification (most often in exchange for a plea) if a
white victim is killed compared with a non-white victim. The logistic
regression coefficient is 1.017, and the odds multiplier is 2.8,
indicating that the odds that the state's attorney will not withdraw a
death notification once filed is almost three times higher.
This "race of victim" effect does not hold up, however, at the
decision of the state's attorney to advance a case to a penalty trial. In
Table 8C we provide two versions of the relationship between victim's
race and the decision to advance a case to a penalty trial. In the first,
there is a case characteristic that is not significantly related to the
outcome variable but is included to make a more conservative test of
the racial disparity hypothesis. In the second version, this factor is
dropped and there is only one significant case characteristic included.
In the first version, the coefficient for a homicide involving a white
victim is positive, and marginally significant (b = .837, p < .10; an
odds ratio of 2.3). At least in this model, then, there is an indication
that state's attorneys are more likely to advance a case to a penalty
trial if the victim killed is white rather than non-white. In the second
model specification, however, the magnitude of the coefficient for
victim's race was reduced by approximately twenty-five percent and is
no longer even marginally significant (b = .667, odds ratio of 1.9).
Table 8D reports the results of two models for victim's race at the
decision of the judge or jury to impose a death sentence given that a
penalty trial has occurred. The race of the victim has no effect in
either of the two models (the odds ratio in both models is close to 1.0).
In Table 8E we report the results of a logistic regression model
for defendants who are sentenced to death among the universe of all
death eligible cases. This table shows that, even taking into account
jurisdiction and relevant case characteristics, offenders who murder
white victims are significantly more likely to be sentenced to death
than those who slay all non-white victims. The logistic regression
coefficient in this model is 1.317, and the odds multiplier is 3.7,
indicating that the odds that a death eligible defendant will be
sentenced to death is almost four times higher if they kill a white
victim than if no victim was white.
the probability of the event not occurring). Since we find them useful, we will calculate and
report probabilities for each set of results.
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For all of the multivariate analyses reported in this paper we
also estimated a stepwise logistic regression model to see if our results
would hold up under a different model specification, and with only
two exceptions, they did. We report one of these exceptions in Table
8F. The stepwise logistic regression model for the race of the victim
on whether the defendant receives a death sentence for all death
eligible cases shows that the effect of killing a white victim was still
present, but now it was statistically significant at only a. 11 level. The
estimated logistic regression parameter was reduced from 1.317 (with
an odds multiplier of 3.73) to .644 (with an odds multiplier of 1.90).
Even in this second model specification, the race of the victim still
substantively matters, but we would note that both its magnitude and
its level of statistical significance declines.
In order to better capture the magnitude of the race of victim
effect, in Table 8G we have calculated the predicted probability of
each outcome in the death sentencing process for white and non-white
victim cases both before and after adjusting for case characteristics.
The adjusted probability that a state's attorney will file a death
notification when a white is killed is .254 and .149 when a black is
killed. This means that the probability of a death notification in a
white victim cases is 1.7 times higher than that for a black victim
homicide, even after considering relevant case characteristics and the
jurisdiction where the homicide occurred. The probability of a death
notification not being withdrawn is 1.5 times higher in white victim
than black victim homicides, again, even after taking into account case
factors and jurisdiction. At both of these early decision making points,
then, the race of the victim killed in a homicide is an important factor
in determining which death eligible defendants are notified that the
state will seek the death penalty against them, and for whom that
notification will "stick." The probability that the state's attorney will
advance a case to a penalty trial once a death notification is filed and
not withdrawn does not appear to be materially affected by the race of
the victim. In both versions of the statistical model, the probability of
a penalty trial is fairly comparable in white and non-white victim
cases. For the probability of a death sentence conditional on a penalty
trial, the difference between white victim and non-white victim cases
is also small.
The last entry in Table 8F, however, shows that for all death
eligible homicides the probability of a death sentence in a white victim
case is over three times higher than in a non-white victim homicide
(.031 for white victim cases and .009 for non-white victims cases;
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Version #1). The estimated probability of a death sentence among
death eligible homicides in the stepwise logistic model is twice as high
for white victim cases (.018) than it is for non-white victim cases
(.009). In the stepwise model, the effect of victim's race does
diminish from our earlier model specification (Version # 1), but killing
a white victim rather than a non-white victim still materially affects a
person's risk that they will be sentenced to death. Net of case
characteristics and jurisdiction, killing a white victim at a minimum
doubles the risk of a death sentence among death eligible homicides
when compared with killing a non-white victim.
In sum, we find a significant effect for the race of the victim in
the way the prosecutor initially handles death eligible homicides.
State's attorneys in Maryland are more likely to file a notification to
seek a death sentence and more likely to retain that notification when
the race of the victim is white rather than black. Furthermore, this
"race of victim" effect is explained neither by the case characteristics
of white and non-white victim homicides nor by the jurisdiction where
the homicide occurred. Nor is this initial disparity in prosecutorial
decision-making corrected at later stages of the capital sentencing
process. While the race of the victim does not appear to matter when
the decision is to advance a case to the penalty phase or to sentence a
defendant to death after a penalty phase hearing, the overall risk of a
death sentence among the universe of death eligible cases is
substantially higher for those accused of murdering a white victim.
4. Offender- Victim Race Combinations
In Tables 9A to 9G we report logistic regression models for
combinations of offender's and victim's race. The racial combination
of offender's and victim's race is expressed in our statistical models as
a series of dummy variables, where the reference category are
homicides involving black defendants and white victims. Table 9A
shows that net of relevant case characteristics and the jurisdiction
where the homicide occurred, all combinations of offender's and
victim's race are significantly less likely to be charged with a capital
crime given that it is death eligible than black offenders who kill white
victims. 93  Both blacks who kill blacks and homicides involving
"other" combinations of offender's and victim's race are significantly
less likely to have a death notification "stick" than homicides
93. Other combinations include white offenders who kill blacks and a very small
number of cases involving "other" races (Hispanic, Asian, Native American) of either the
victim or offender.
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involving black offenders and white victims (Table 13B). The only
other occasion where the stepwise logistic regression model that we
estimated as a check on our model specification produced a different
result is in this instance. Table 9C shows that in the stepwise
specification there are no significant differences in the decision to
withdraw a death notification across race of offender/victim groups.
There is no race of offender/victim effect at either the decision to
advance a case to a penalty hearing (Table 9D) or the decision to
sentence a defendant to death given the fact that there is a penalty
hearing (Table 9E). Table 9F does show, however, that compared with
black offenders who slay white victims, whites who kill whites and
blacks who kill blacks are significantly less likely to be sentenced to
death given that a homicide is death eligible. The primary reason for
this elevated risk of a death sentence for black offenders who cross
racial lines and slay whites is the differential charging decisions of
Maryland state's attorneys (Table 9A).
Table 9G provides the predicted probabilities of each outcome
for the four race- of-offender/victim combinations at each stage of the
Maryland capital sentencing system. After controlling for case
characteristics and charging jurisdiction, the probability that the state's
attorney will file a notification to seek the death penalty is highest in
cases where a black offender kills a white victim (.336). The
probability of being death notified for black on white killings is over
twice as high as when a black slays another black (.141), and nearly
twice as high as when a white kills a white (. 187). The probability that
a death notification will "stick" is comparably high for both white on
white (p = .768) and black on white (p = .726) killings and both are
about one and one-half times higher than when blacks kill other blacks
(p = .500). These differences are diminished in the probabilities
estimated from the stepwise logistic regression (version 2 in Table
9G). The probability of a penalty trial conditional on a death
notification not being withdrawn and the probability of a death
sentence conditional on a penalty trial is fairly similar for the four
racial groups (other combinations for the conditional probability of a
death sentence is the exception).
Finally, the unconditional probability of a death sentence
within the universe of all death eligible cases shows pronounced racial
effects. Even after considering case characteristics and the charging
jurisdiction, black defendants who cross racial lines and slay a white
victim are most likely to be sentenced to death (p = .041). This
probability is more than twice as high as for white-on-white killings,
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almost three and one-half times higher as for black-on-black killings,
and nearly seven times higher than other racial combinations.
Consistently, black offenders who kill white victims are at greater risk
of in Maryland's capital sentencing system even after controlling for
numerous case characteristics and the jurisdiction where the crime
occurred. The primarily reason for this is the differential treatment of
black-on-white killings given by local prosecutors at the charging
stage, a differential treatment, however, that goes uncorrected. at
subsequent decision making points.
In sum, in our analysis we have found evidence for a race of
victim effect and an effect for the combination of offender's and
victim's race. Offenders who kill white victims, especially if the
offender is black, are significantly and substantially more likely to be
charged with a capital crime (state's attorney decides to file a
notification to seek the death penalty). Those who kill white victims
are also significantly more likely to have their death notification
"stick" than those who kill non-whites. These effects persist even in
the presence of what we think are very rigorous controls for relevant
case characteristics and the charging jurisdiction. Moreover, while
these effects do not appear at other, later decision making points in the
capital sentencing process they are generally not corrected either.
C. Further Analysis: The Combined Impact of Jurisdiction and Race
on Maryland Death Eligible Cases
Our analyses have thus far revealed two interesting substantive
findings. One of the most impressive findings from this research is
that in terms of the handling of death eligible homicides, the
jurisdiction where the homicide occurred and where the defendant was
charged by the state's attorney matter a great deal. Under state law,
Maryland state's attorneys have considerable and unguided discretion
in determining whether or not to charge a death eligible crime as a
capital offense94 , and once charged whether or not to withdraw the
capital charge.95 We find in this research that this discretion is used
with great frequency. The variation in the treatment of death eligible
cases in the hands of local prosecutors across the different legal
jurisdictions was substantial and robust. In the Maryland death
penalty system, the jurisdiction where the crime occurs and legal
94. See Calhoun v. State, 468 A.2d 45, 63-65 (Md. 1983); Richardson v. State, 598 A.2d
1,passim (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), afid, 630 A.2d 238 (Md. 1993).
95. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-301 (2002).
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prosecution begins is clearly one of the most important factors in
determining which death eligible defendants are ultimately sentenced
to death and which are not.
Our second finding is that even taking into consideration the
charging jurisdiction and relevant case characteristics race matters as
well. Those who kill whites, particularly if they happen to be non-
white, are at an increased risk of being charged with a capital offense,
of having that capital charge not withdrawn, and ultimately of being
sentenced to death. We also have found that our two key variables,
jurisdiction and race, are confounded. To further address what we
think is a third important finding, we now provide some supplemental
analyses to further demonstrate the role of legal jurisdiction and race
in the handling of death penalty cases in Maryland. In this analysis,
we focus on what happens to the magnitude of the "race effect" with
and without controls for the charging jurisdiction. Our examination of
the "race effect" includes the victim's race, and intra-racial homicides
involving black offenders and white victims.
In Table 10, we report the results of a series of logistic
regression models. The subset of cases are all those where a
notification was filed by the state's attorney that the state intends to
seek the death penalty, and the decision is whether or not a death
sentence is imposed. Model 1 shows that considered alone the race of
the victim matters, and matters a great deal. Those who kill white
victims are at a substantially increased risk of being sentenced to death
compared with those who kill non-whites. In Model 2, we enter the
number of statutory aggravating factors that the prosecutor charges in
the death notification document. 96  The number of statutory
aggravating factors that are alleged by the state's attorney clearly
elevates the risk of a death sentence, but it only slightly diminishes the
race of victim effect (the estimated logistic regression coefficient
declines from .779 in Model 1 to .762 in Model 2). The results for
Model 2 are identical to those reported by Professors Baldus and
Woodworth in their 2001 analysis of Maryland death-noticed cases.
97
In Model 3 we drop the number of statutory aggravating factors
alleged in the charging document and add each of the separate
96. Under state law, state's attorneys must file a notification that they intend to seek a
death sentence against a defendant, and the statutory aggravating circumstances that they will
prove. MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW § 2-202 (a) (1) (2002).
97. David C. Baldus and George Woodworth, Race of Victim and Race of Defendant
Disparities in the Administration of Maryland's Capital Charging and Sentencing System
(1979-1996): Preliminary Finding (Feb. 14, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
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charging jurisdictions (counties and Baltimore City). When the
prosecuting jurisdictions are added to the model, the effect for the
victim's race diminishes substantially, and is no longer statistically
significant. This would suggest that jurisdiction and race of victim are
confounded. There are state's attorneys in Maryland who more
frequently pursue the death penalty than others do. There are also
more white-victim homicides committed in these jurisdictions where
there is a more aggressive pursuit of the death penalty. When both
jurisdiction and the number of statutory aggravating factors are
included in the model (Model 4), the effect of victim's race declines
again, but only slightly, while the estimated effect for the number of
statutory aggravating circumstances increases slightly, indicating that
jurisdiction is acting as a suppressor. These results imply that, at least
in Maryland, any discussion of possible race of victim effects in the
processing of capital cases must explicitly consider the jurisdiction
where the crime was charged.
We report a similar analysis in Table 11, but here we focus on
black offenders who kill white victims among the subset of death-
notified cases. Model 1 shows that black offenders who kill white
victims are significantly more likely than all other racial combinations
to be sentenced to death. This is true even when there are controls for
the number of statutory aggravating factors (Model 2). When the
charging jurisdiction is entered in Model 3, the effect for black
offenders who kill white victims is reduced by about 22%, but is still
significant and substantively important. It continues to be significant
even with controls for both county and the number of statutory
aggravating factors (Model 4). The findings with respect to cross-
racial murders involving black defendants and white victims are robust
with respect to statutory aggravating factors and jurisdiction, but there
is a non-trivial reduction in the magnitude of the effect when
jurisdiction is controlled.
The effect of jurisdiction in reducing the "race effect"
(revealing the confound between jurisdiction and race) is further
shown in Tables 12 and 13. Table 12 reports the results of a logistic
regression analysis for the race of the victim on both the death notice
decision and the death sentence decision within the universe of all
death eligible homicides. Without jurisdiction controls, there is a very
strong relationship between killing a white victim and being death
noticed (Table 12: logistic regression coefficient of 1.311, X2 = 89.86).
With the addition of the jurisdiction controls, however, this
relationship, though still statistically significant, is reduced
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dramatically (logistic regression coefficient of .697, X2 = 17.17). For
the death notice decision, the estimated probability of a death notice
among white victim cases drops from .430 in the model without
jurisdiction to .282 in the model that includes county controls - a 52%
decline.
Among the universe of death eligible cases reported in Table
12 there is also a strong relationship between killing a white victim
and receiving a death sentence. Without controlling for jurisdiction the
logistic regression coefficient for the relationship between killing a
white victim and receiving a death sentence is substantively strong and
statistically significant (logistic regression coefficient of 1.657, x2 =
31.06). With the addition of only the jurisdiction controls, however,
this relationship, though still statistically significant, is reduced
dramatically (logistic regression coefficient of .943, x2  = 8.15).
Without jurisdiction controls, the predicted probability of a death
sentence for those who kill white victims is .111 and is .023 for those
who kill non-white victims. Killers of whites, therefore, are almost
five times more likely to be sentenced to death if death eligible than
are killers of non-whites. With controls for jurisdiction, however, the
estimated probability of a death sentence in white victim homicides is
almost cut in half, to .060. The estimated probability of a death
sentence in homicides with non-white victims is virtually unchanged
in non-white victim cases. After controls for jurisdiction, the
probability of a death sentence among death eligible cases is only 2.5
times higher in white victim compared with non-white victim cases.
Table 13 reports comparable results for homicides involving
black offenders who slay white victims. The cases include the
universe of all death eligible homicides, and both the decision to file a
notification to seek death and the decision to impose a death sentence
are examined. Without jurisdiction controls blacks that kill whites are
significantly more likely to receive a notification to seek death than
homicides involving all other racial combinations (logistic regression
coefficient of 1.099, X2 = 44.88). When the charging jurisdiction is
controlled, the magnitude of the regression coefficient remains
substantively strong and statistically significant, but declines to .899
(with a X 2 = 27.61). When jurisdiction is not controlled, the estimated
probability of being death notified is .463 among homicides with black
offenders and white victims, and .239 for all other racial combinations.
Blacks who kill whites, therefore, are almost twice as likely to be
death notified. When jurisdiction is controlled, the estimated
probability of being death notified declines for both racial
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combinations to .353 in black-on-white killings and to .182 in all other
racial combinations. The risk of being death notified, however,
remains almost twice as high in homicides with black offenders and
white victims.
Much the same pattern prevails when the decision to impose a
death sentence among all death eligible cases is examined (Table 13).
Without jurisdiction controls, blacks who kill whites are more than
three times more likely to be sentenced to death than all other racial
combinations (.139 versus .042). When the charging jurisdiction is
added to the model, the magnitude of the logistic regression coefficient
declines (as does the chi-square), and blacks that kill whites are 2.6
times more likely to be sentenced to death than other racial
combinations (.077 versus .030).
What these supplemental analyses clearly reveal is that
jurisdiction and the racial characteristics of the homicide are
confounded. Different legal jurisdictions in the state of Maryland,
jurisdictions that follow very different practices regarding the handling
of death eligible homicides, differ with respect to the racial
characteristics of their homicides. At least in these data, failure to
control for jurisdictional differences can lead to a biased estimate of
the "race effect".
The relationship between the differential handling of death
eligible homicides in Maryland and the racial characteristics of the
homicide are summarized in Table 14. The first two columns show
quite clearly that in terms of filing a formal notification to seek death
and death sentencing rates, there are clear jurisdictional differences.
Some jurisdictions are substantially more aggressive in seeking and
imposing death sentences than others. What the last two columns
show is that the aggressiveness of the jurisdiction with respect to its
handling of death eligible homicides is related to the racial
characteristics of those homicides. Jurisdictions that are less
aggressive in their handling of death eligible cases (Baltimore City,
Prince George's County) tend to be those with a lower rate of white
victim and black-on-white homicides. Conversely, those jurisdictions
that are more aggressive (Baltimore County, Harford County) in how
they process death eligible cases have higher rates of white victim and
black-on-white homicides. What this implies is that any attempt to
deal with any racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty in
Maryland cannot ignore the substantial variability that exists in
different state's attorneys' offices in the processing of death cases.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The analyses presented in this study have explored a number of
issues related to the death penalty sentencing system in Maryland. The
primary focus has been on the possible effects of geography and race
of victim and race of defendant variables. The analysis suggests that
both classes of variables play an important role in the Maryland
system. The evidence indicates that these factors exert their greatest
effects at the death notification and death notice retraction decisions.
Later stages of the system do not appear to exacerbate or increase the
magnitude of these effects, but neither are the results of these
prosecutors' decisions corrected at later points. The effects of
prosecutorial decision-making remain apparent in the imposition of
death sentences among the universe of death eligible cases.
It might not be too surprising that evidence of disparity by race
and geography are manifested at the level of the Maryland State's
Attorney. We have noted in the introduction that under Maryland law
the decision to charge a defendant with a capital crime by formally
filing a notification to seek the death penalty, and the decision to
withdraw that notification once filed are completely discretionary
decisions by the state's attorney. Maryland prosecutors are by law
given extremely wide discretion to seek death, there are no formal
guidelines or standards they need to follow, nor is there any
accountability for decisions made or not made. This virtually
complete granting of discretion provides ample opportunity for the
influence of other factors in state's attorney's decisions, such as the
race of the offender and/or victim. This discretion is also the source of
the substantial jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction variation in the decision to
seek a death sentence and ultimately the decision to impose death.
Our empirical findings with respect to racial and geographic
disparity in the administration of the death penalty in Maryland are not
strikingly unusual or aberrant results. The evidence found in
Maryland squares well with numerous other studies with somewhat
different methodologies in different states. 98  Since there is an
98. A persistent finding in this body of research is that the race of the victim is
substantially influential in the death penalty process. Murderers of white victims, particularly
if they happened to be African-American, fare worse at virtually every decision making point,
but especially with charging decisions made by prosecutors. There is some, but considerably
less consistent evidence of a race of defendant effect. See DAVID C. BALDUS, ET AL., EQUAL
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, 403-04, passim
(1990).; SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
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abundant literature now available, we have not reviewed these
previous findings here. We would note, however, that while evidence
of disparity in the imposition of the death penalty by race and
geography have not always been found, the majority of the empirical
research has found both that those who kill white victims are at a
substantially higher risk of being sentenced to death (especially if they
are non-white) than those who kill non-white victims, and that the risk
of being sentenced to death varies substantially within the state.
99
With respect to the influence of victim's race, the United States
General Accounting Office after reviewing twenty-eight studies of the
death penalty concluded that:
In 82% of the studies, race of victim was found to
influence the likelihood of being charged with capital
murder or receiving the death penalty, i.e., those who
murdered whites were found to be more likely to be
sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks.
This finding was remarkably consistent across data sets,
states, data collection methods, and analytic
techniques.1
00
We have no reason to believe, therefore, that our findings that
race and geography matter in Maryland are idiosyncratic. They fit a
much broader pattern of how the death penalty is generally
administered in the United States today.'
0 1
While this research has documented the existence of both racial
and geographic disparity in the administration of the death penalty in
Maryland, our empirical findings are silent with respect to the question
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING, 43-94 (1989); BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY,
THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY, 70-150 (1987); Lee Bienan, et al., The
Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41
RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 158-240 (1988); Thomas J. Keil and Gennardo F. Vito, Race and the
Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials: 1976-1991, 20 AM. J. CRIM. J. (1995); Stephen P.
Klein & John E. Rolph, Relationship of Offender and Victim Race to Death Penalty Sentences
in Calfornia, 32 JURIMETRICS J., 33, passim (1991); Raymond Paternoster & Ann Marie
Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death Penalty in South Carolina: Experiences Over the
First Few Years, 39 S.C. L. REV. 245, 283-334 (1988).
99. See supra note 96.
100. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, GAO/GGD-
90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICIATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES
5(1990).
101. See, e.g., David C. Baldus, et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in
the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings From
Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV., 1638, 1713-1715,passim (1998).
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as to how these disparities came about. Anyone vaguely familiar with
the history of race relations in the United States cannot be surprised at
our findings of a race effect. It was not that long ago in our history
that lynchings and other forms of violence were used to enforce rules
of racial etiquette and re-establish the supremacy of whites.' 02 Nor are
we far removed from the fate of the Scottsboro Boys, nine young black
males accused of raping two white women in Alabama. The trials,
which began only twelve days after the crime and lasted only four
days, resulted in eight of the nine youths being sentenced to death, in
each case by an all white jury. 10 3
There is abundant evidence of the closeness of our current
history with this troubled past. In a 1974 murder trial, Wilbum
Dobbs, a black male accused of the murder of a white man in Georgia,
was referred to by both the judge and his own defense lawyer as a
"colored boy."' 1 4 Dobbs' counsel stated that blacks are generally an
uneducated lot who are better basketball players than teachers. 10 5 He
further observed that racial integration was responsible for the
deterioration of local neighborhoods and schools, and referred to the
African-American community of Chattanooga, Tennessee as "black
boy jungle."'10 6  In a 1986 Florida case, the judge referred to the
parents of an African-American defendant as the "nigger mom and
dad."' 0 7 The lawyer for Jose Guzmon, a Salvadoran, referred to him
as a "wetback" before his all-white jury during Mr. Guzmon's 1985
trial.'0 8 In 1981, the former District Attorney of Jackson County,
Mississippi, Ed Peters, publicly announced his policy to "get rid of as
many" blacks as possible when using his peremptory challenges to
102. See EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE
19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH (1984); W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHINGS IN THE NEW
SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 (1993); JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF
RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION, 183-189
(1984).
103. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH, passim (2d ed.
1994); JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, 85-89 (Vintage Books 1995).
104. Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 963 F.2d 1403 (11 th
Cir. 1991), rev'd, 506 U.S. 357 (1993).
105. Id. at 1577.
106. Id.
107. Peek v. Florida, 488 So. 2d 52, 56 (Fla. 1986). In its review of the case, the Florida
Supreme Court stated that judges in the state should be careful with their language so as to
avoid the "appearance" of impartiality. Id. For a further discussion of Peek v. Florida, Dobbs
v. Zant and a discussion of the impact of racial attitudes on the application of the death
penalty see Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV., 433 (1995).
108. Exparte Guzmon, 730 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
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select a jury.' 09 These and many other examples from far too many
cases "0 reveals that the reach of our history of racial animus is not
beyond us, a point eloquently made by Justice Brennan in McCleskey
v. Kemp:
A mere three generations ago, this Court
sanctioned racial segregation, stating that "[i]f one race
be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them upon the same plane."
In more recent times, we have sought to free
ourselves from the burden of this history. Yet, it has
been scarcely a generation since this Court's first
decision striking down racial segregation, and barely
two decades since the legislative prohibition of racial
discrimination in major domains of national life. These
have been honorable steps, but we cannot pretend that
in three decades we have completely escaped the grip
of a historical legacy spanning centuries. We remain
imprisoned by the past as long as we deny its influence
in the present."'
Our finding that race influences the decisions made by state's
attorneys whether to seek or withdraw a capital charge does not mean
that they are motivated by intentional racial prejudice or bigotry. In its
report, the Governor's Task Force on Capital Punishment noted that a
survey of Maryland State's Attorneys revealed that several used the
wishes of the victim's family in deciding whether to seek a death
sentence. 112 Public opinion polls consistently show that support for
the death penalty is substantially higher among whites than among
109. Edwards v. Scroggy, 849 F.2d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1988).
110. See, e.g., John H. Blume, et al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in
Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, (1998); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death
and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433 (1995); TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (2000), http://www.texasdefender.org/publications.htm (last
visited May 19, 2004) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion,
Gender and Class). For a discussion of the impact of ineffective representation for indigent
defendants in capital cases see Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence
Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835 (1994).
109. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 552 (1896)).
112. 1993 REPORT, supra note 58, at 113-18.
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African-Americans, as is general trust in legal authorities." 3 Although
we have no data on this issue, it is reasonable to suppose that the
families of white murder victims may more aggressively push a state's
attorney to seek the penalty than families of non-white murder victims.
Assuming also that state's attorney's are responsive to the demands of
victim's families, they would, then, be more likely to charge a capital
crime and less likely to withdraw that charge for white victim cases.
Because they are all too aware of the history of the death penalty and
are generally suspicious of legal authorities, black family members
may have fewer and less responsive interactions with their state's
attorneys' offices.' 14
There are even more subtle ways for racial effects to manifest
themselves given the opportunity provided by the discretion in the
hands of state's attorneys. For example, psychological evidence points
to the fact that whites are more likely to empathize with and feel
sympathy for other whites more than non-whites. 1 5  White decision
makers in the capital punishment system may, therefore,
unconsciously make decisions that favor white victims.1 6 This greater
sympathy for white victims by white decision makers may be
113. Public opinion consistently shows that support for the death penalty among whites is
substantially higher than among blacks. In the General Social Survey (a nationally
representative sampling of American adults conducted by the National Opinion Research
Center at the University of Chicago), for example, pooling the data across all years (N=
approximately 35,000) finds that 78% of whites support the death penalty for those who
commit murder while only 50% of blacks. In each of the 21 times that the capital punishment
question has been asked from 1974-2000, the percentage difference in support for the death
penalty between whites and blacks is generally thirty percent. See TOM R. TYLER, ET AL.,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY, (Westview Press 1997); TOM R. TYLER AND YUEN J.
Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS
(Russell Sage Foundation 2002); Robert J. Sampson and Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal
Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial
Differences, 32 Law & Soc'y Rev. 777, 790-800 (1998).
114. See TOM R. TYLER, ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (Westview Press
1997); TOM R. TYLER AND YUEN J. HUo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (Russell Sage Foundation 2002).
115. Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 26, (2000); Dougas Linder, Jury Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV. 887, 900-02
(1996); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and
Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343, (2003); Bryan Edelman, Misguided Discretion:
A Dual Process Model of Juror and Jury Decision Making in Capital Trials (2003)
(unpunblished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Nevada) (on file with author).
116. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Samuel H, Pillsbury,
Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655
(1989).
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particularly salient in intra-racial slayings, and certainly would
characterize other decision makers besides state's attorneys. 117
We noted in the introduction that our empirical analysis of
Maryland's capital sentencing system did not include all possible
decision making points. For example, we did not consider the role of
race or geography in the many decisions law enforcement makes in
investigating death homicide cases. We know that state's attorneys'
decisions to file (and retain) a notification to seek a death sentence is
based at least in part of the strength of the evidence that law
enforcement officers develop and construct. An important issue to
address in future research is the whether or not there is variation in the
extent to which law enforcement officers investigate white victim and
black victim homicides. We clearly speculate here, but if police
officers empathize more easily with white victims and are suspicious
of or reluctant to work within the black community, they may more
aggressively investigate white victims. For similar reasons, police
departments that are predominately white may routinely investigate
white victim crimes more aggressively than those committed against
non-whites. This difference in how aggressively white and non-white
victim cases are investigated, both within the same police department
and across different police departments, would mean that state's
attorneys are handed white victim cases with much stronger evidence
with which to prosecute. Even if state's attorneys' decisions are
completely evenhanded, the disparity in the evidence (both its quantity
and quality) gathered by law enforcement officers would result in a
greater likelihood that a sentence of death would be sought and not
withdrawn in white victim cases than in non-white victim cases. We
are quick to point out that we have no evidence that police officers do
behave in such a manner, but it is a question worthy of detailed
research.
It is clear that this research has found that some of the earliest
decisions in the process that leads from a homicide to the death
chamber are materially affected by both geography and race. Within
the context of Justice Brennan's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp,1
8
117. Cf. Pillsbury, supra note 114, at 703-10.
118. Justice Brennan stated:
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked his lawyer whether a
jury was likely to sentence him to die. A candid reply to this question would have
been disturbing. First, counsel would have to tell McCleskey that few of the details
of the crime or of McCleskey's past criminal conduct were more important that the
fact that his victim was white .... Finally, the assessment would not be complete
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when defense attorneys have conversations with their condemned
clients on Maryland's death row as to what got them there, that
conversation must include the troubling recognition that among other
things, they likely killed the wrong person in the wrong place.
without the information that cases involving black defendants and white victims are
more likely to result in a death sentence than cases featuring any other racial
combination of defendant and victim. The story could be told in a variety of ways,
but McCleskey could not fail to grasp its essential narrative line: there was a
significant chance that race would play a prominent role in determining if he lived or
died.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Figure 1
Number of Cases Progressing Through Each Stage of the Maryland Death Penalty System
Number of Cases
Stags 1 Stage 2
N 1311 353
Stage 3 Stage 4
213 180
Stage of System
Notes:
Stage 1 = Universe of death eligible cases in Maryland from July 1, 1978 to December 31, 1999
(N- 1,311).
Stage 2 = Subset of death eligible cases where the prosecutor files notice of intent to seek the death
penalty (N = 353). The conditional probability of filing notice given a death eligible case is 353/1311
0.269.
Stage 3 = Subset of death-noticed cases where the prosecutor does not retract notice (i.e., the death notice
"sticks.") (N = 213). The conditional probability of notice sticking given a death eligible case is 213/1311
= 0.162 and the conditional probability of notice sticking given that the prosecutor files notice is 213/353
= 0.603.
Stage 4 = Subset of "stuck" death-noticed cases advancing to a penalty trial (N = 180). The conditional
probability of a case advancing to the penalty phase given that the prosecutor sticks with the death notice
is 180/213 = 0.845.
Stage 5 = Subset of penalty trial cases resulting in the imposition of a death sentence (N = 76). The
conditional probability of a death sentence being imposed given a death eligible case is 76/1311 is 0.058.
The conditional probability of a death sentence being imposed given a death notice that sticks is 76/213
0.357. Finally, the conditional probability of a death sentence being imposed given a penalty trial is 76/
180 = 0.422.
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Figure 2
Offender Race Distribution
Proportion of Cases
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
o Other Offender
r Black Offender
*White Offender
0.022 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.000
0.743 0.653 0.637 0.639 0.684
0.236 0.335 0.354 0.350 0.316
Stage of System
Notes:
Stage 1 = Universe of death eligible cases in Maryland from July 1, 1978 to December 31, 1999
(N = 1,311). There is no information about the race of the defendant in 20 (1.5%) of the cases.
Stage 2 = Subset of death eligible cases where the prosecutor files notice of intent to seek the death
penalty (N = 353). The defendant's race is unknown in 1 case.
Stage 3 = Subset of death-noticed cases where the prosecutor does not retract notice (i.e., the death notice
"sticks.") (N = 213). The defendant's race is unknown in 1 case.
Stage 4 - Subset of cases that advance to a penalty trial (N = 180). The defendant's race is unknown in 1
case.
Stage 5 = Subset of cases reaching the penalty phase resulting in the imposition of a death sentence (N
76). The defendant's race is observed for all 76 cases.
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Figure 3
Victim Race Distribution
Proportion of Cases
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
I Nonwhite
MW hite
0.561 0.343 0.258 0.228 0.197
0.439 0.657 0.742 0.772 0.803
Stage of System
Notes:
Stage 1 = Universe of death eligible cases in Maryland from July 1, 1978 to December 31, 1999
(N = 1,311). There is no information about the race of victim in 64 (4.9%) of the cases. The case is
considered a "white victim case" if at least one white person is killed (in 12 cases at least one white and at
least one black were killed; these cases are considered "white" because at least one white person was
killed). The nonwhite victim group (i.e., cases with no white victims) is comprised mainly of cases with
at least one black victim (N = 649; 92.7%).
Stage 2 = Subset of death eligible cases where the prosecutor files notice of intent to seek the death
penalty (N = 353). The victim's race is unknown in 3 (0.9%) of the 353 cases. The nonwhite victim
group is comprised mainly of cases with at least one black victim (N = 109; 90.8%).
Stage 3 = Subset of death-noticed cases where the prosecutor does not retract notice (i.e., the death notice
"sticks.") (N = 213). The nonwhite victim group is comprised mainly of cases with at least one black
victim (N = 49; 89.1%).
Stage 4 = Subset of cases that advance to a penalty trial (N = 180). The nonwhite victim group is com-
prised mainly of cases with at least one black victim (N = 36; 87.8%).
Stage 5 = Subset of cases reaching the penalty phase resulting in the imposition of a death sentence (N
76). The victim's race is observed for all 76 cases. The nonwhite victim group is comprised entirely of
cases with at least one black victim (N = 15).
2004] THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND
Figure 4
Joint Offender-Victim Race Distribution
E Other Corn bination
rWhite Defendant/ Black Victim
0 Black Defendant/ White Victim
U Black Defendant/ Black Victim
rlWhite Defendant/ White Victim
1 2 3 4 5
0.052 0.037 0.033 0.033 0.000
0.018 0.032 0.014 0.006 0.013
0.225 0.352 0,401 0.428 0.500
0.494 0.280 0.217 0.194 0.184
0,211 0.301 0.335 0.339 0.303
Stage of System
Notes:
Stage 1 = Universe of death eligible cases in Maryland from July 1, 1978 to December 31, 1999
(N 1 ,311). Either the race of the victim or the defendant is unknown in 84 (6.4%) of the cases.
Stage 2 - Subset of death eligible cases where the prosecutor files notice of intent to seek the death
penalty (N =353). Either the race of the victim or the defendant is unknown in 4 of these 353 (1.1%)
cases.
Stage 3 = Subset of death-noticed cases where the prosecutor does not retract notice (i.e., the death notice
"sticks.") (N = 213). Either the race of the victim or the defendant is unknown in 1 of these cases.
Stage 4 - Subset of cases advancing to a penalty trial (N 180). Both the race of the victim and the
defendant are observed for all 180 cases.
Stage 5 = Subset of cases reaching the penalty phase resulting in the imposition of a death sentence (N =
76). Both the race of the victim and the defendant are observed for all 76 cases.
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Figure 5
County Contributions to Each Stage of the Maryland Death Penalty System
100%
90%
80%
70%
U 60%
0 50%
.0
u 40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
[ Other Counties 0,140 0.238 0.202 0.200
SqPrince George's 0.176 0.247 0.164 0.144 0.105
, Montgomery 0.045 0.031 0.033 0.039 0.026
E]Harford 0.027 0.054 0.038 0.033 0.040
1@ Baltimore County 0.117 0,281 0.390 0.417 0.447
MBaltimore City 0.435 0.099 0.113 1 0.132 ]
*Anne Arundel 0.061 0.051 0.061 0.067 0.066
Stage of System
Notes:
Stage 1 = Universe of death eligible cases in Maryland from July 1, 1978 to December 31, 1999
(N = 1,311). The county in which the charge is brought is unknown in six of these cases. For all subsequent
stages there is no missing county information.
Stage 2 = Subset of death eligible cases where the prosecutor files notice of intent to seek the death penalty (N
= 353).
Stage 3 = Subset of death-noticed cases where the prosecutor does not retract notice (i.e., the death notice
"sticks.") (N = 213).
Stage 4 = Subset of cases advancing to a penalty trial (N = 180).
Stage 5 = Subset of cases reaching the penalty phase resulting in the imposition of a death sentence (N = 76).
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Table I
List of Covariates Used For Statistical Analysis
Covariates Studied For Universe of Death Eligible Cases (N = 1,202) Mean/Proportion
1. Number of prior violent felony convictions (0,1,2,3+) 0.558
2. Multiple victim case 0.183
3. Any of the victims a stranger to defendant 0.414
4. Any of the victims has a criminal history 0.083
5. Defendant has a history of alcohol abuse 0.339
6. Defendant has a history of drug abuse 0.506
7. Defendant has history of mental illness/emotional problems 0.217
8. Defendant under age 21 at time of offense 0.265
9. Defendant over age 60 0.005
10. Defendant unable to control conduct due to alcohol/drugs 0.289
11. Defendant unable to control conduct due to mental/emotional problems 0.127
12. Defendant under control/influence of another person 0.080
13. Defendant's participation in crime was minor 0.022
14. Defendant claims killing was accidental 0.067
15. Defendant was physically abused as a child 0.113
16. Defendant was sexually abused as a child 0.043
17. Defendant had generally good character 0.075
18. Defendant had trouble in school 0.504
19. Defendant had trouble holding a job 0.385
20. Defendant has history of physical abuse as a child 0.116
21. Defendant has history of sexual abuse as a child 0.043
22. Defendant has spouse and/or family 0.285
23. Defendant admitted crime 0.334
24. Defendant expressed remorse for crime 0.126
25. Defendant has history of mental illness/emotional problems 0.205
26. Defendant has history of drug or alcohol use/abuse 0.512
27. Defendant has an organic brain disorder 0.027
28. Defendant maintains innocence 0.427
29. Defendant has no major criminal history 0.240
30. Defendant aided or assisted the victim 0.004
31. Defendant surrendered within 24 hours 0.032
32. Defendant was not the actual killer 0.037
33. Defendant lay in wait for/ambushed the victim 0.363
34. Defendant showed no remorse for the killing 0.116
35. Defendant expressed pleasure at the killing 0.031
36. Defendant alleged to have committed additional crimes contemporaneously 0.297
37. Defendant actively evaded arrest 0.095
38. Defendant was a fugitive for a prior violent crime 0.012
39. Defendant escaped from custody 0.017
40. Defendant implicated in other killing(s) 0.052
41. Defendant interfered with judicial process 0.017
42. Defendant has previously threatened/attempted to kill victim 0.017
43. Defendant threatened victim in front of family 0.036
44. Defendant threatened other family members 0.028
45. Defendant threatened to kill victim in advance 0.021
46. Defendant abandoned victim who might otherwise have lived 0.075
47. Defendant persisted in attack even after death was certain 0.140
48. Defendant forced his/her way into place of murder of any of the victims 0.176
49. Weapon brought to the murder scene of any of the victims 0.659
50. Any of the victims killed with a bizarre or unusual weapon 0.097
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Table I (continued)
List of Covariates Used For Statistical Analysis
Covariates Studied For Universe of Death Eligible Cases (N = 1,202) Mean/Proportion
51. Any of the victims forced to beg/plead for their lives 0.069
52. Any of the victims' murder planned for more than five minutes 0.282
53. Any of the victims offered no resistance to killer 0.240
54. Any of the victims not clothed or in bedclothes at time of killing 0.170
55. Any of the victims suffered multiple trauma 0.212
56. Any of the victims bound/gagged or otherwise restrained 0.121
57. Any of the victims forced to do something against their will 0.166
58. Any of the victims held hostage prior to killing 0.037
59. Any of the victims tortured or mutilated before killing 0.056
60. Any of the victims mutilated after killing 0.034
61. Any of the victims brutally clubbed, beaten, stomped on 0.146
62. Any of the victims shot more than one time 0.265
63. Any of the victims shot in the face 0.089
64. Any of the victims killed execution style 0.129
65. Defendant tried to hide or dispose of bodies of any of the victims 0.130
66. Defendant lay in wait for any of the victims 0.098
67. Any of the victims stabbed many times or had throat slashed 0.183
68. There was another victim that was injured but not killed by defendant 0.131
69. Any of the victims killed in front of another person (not co-defendant) 0.339
70. Crime scene was described as a bloody mess or particularly gruesome 0.121
71. Any of the victims' murder took a long time to complete 0.087
72. Physical details of crime are unusually repulsive/horrific 0.044
73. Any of the victims bedridden or physically handicapped 0.021
74. Any of the victims mentally/emotionally impaired 0.004
75. Any of the victims defenseless due to youth 0.057
76. Any of the victims defenseless due to advanced age 0.115
77. Any of the victims pregnant 0.009
78. Any of the victims asleep, just awakened or in bedroom 0.116
79. Any of the victims in own house when defendant intruded 0.247
80. Any of the victims defenseless due to gross size/strength disparity 0.131
81. Any of the victims defenseless due to intoxication 0.082
82. Any of the victims defenseless due to frail condition/illness 0.033
83. Any of the victims have children or grandchildren 0.225
84. Any of the victims killed after kidnapping/abduction 0.060
85. Any of the victims verbally/physically mistreated prior to killing 0.336
86. Any of the victims dismembered before killing 0.004
87. Any of the victims mutilated in some way before killing 0.030
88. Any of the victims sexually abused before killing 0.094
89. Any of the victims burned before killing 0.026
90. Defendant slapped, kicked, or punched any of the victims before death 0.165
91. Any of the victims thrown in a body of water before being killed 0.004
92. Any of the victims subjected to unknown form of abuse before killing 0.022
93. Any of the victims dismembered after being killed 0.004
94. Any of the victims mutilated after being killed 0.017
95. Any of the victims sexually abused after killing 0.018
96. Any of the victims burned after killing 0.030
97. Defendant slapped, kicked, or punched any of the victims after death 0.003
98. Any of the victims put in the trash or dump after death 0.015
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Table I (continued)
List of Covariates Used For Statistical Analysis
Covariates Studied For Universe of Death Eligible Cases (N = 1,202) Mean/Proportion
99. Any of the victims thrown in a body of water after being killed 0.020
100. Any of the victims subjected to unknown form of abuse after killing 0.008
101. Defendant made full confession to first-degree murder to police 0.182
102. Defendant made full confession to second-degree murder 0.063
103. Defendant made full confession to aggravating circumstances 0.151
104. Defendant made partial/qualified confession to first-degree murder 0.025
105. Defendant made partial/qualified confession to second-degree murder 0.045
106. Defendant made partial/qualified confession to aggravating circumstances 0.047
107. One eyewitness to the event testified 0.259
108. More than one eyewitness to the event testified 0.209
109. Physical evidence linking defendant to the crime was present 0.256
110. An informant or jail-house snitch testified against defendant 0.092
111. Defense claims case is based on circumstantial evidence 0.022
112. Defense claims state's burden of proof not met 0.020
Statutory Aggravating Factors (Death-Noticed Cases Only; N = 327) Mean/Proportion
113. Victim was a law enforcement officer 0.055
114. Murder committed while defendant was in an institution 0.043
I15. Murder committed in effort to evade capture by authorities 0.037
116. Murder committed in course of kidnapping 0.156
117. Victim was a child under the age of 12 0.000
118. Defendant carried out a contract killing 0.049
119. Defendant solicited killing 0.018
120. Defendant was serving a sentence of life imprisonment or death 0.012
121. Multiple victim murder 0.205
122. Murder committed along with carjacking/robbery/rape/arson 0.810
123. Number of Statutory Aggravating Factors Present (1, 2, 3+) 1.544
MARGINS
Table 2
Processing of Offender Race Groups at Various Stages of Maryland Death Penalty System
Test #1
p(death notice I death eligible offense, offender is black) = 0.240 N 0.240 - 0.368 = -0.128
p(death notice I death eligible offense, offender is not black) = 0.368 J
N = 1,291 (20 Missing Cases); X1 w/l df = 20.259; p < .05
Test #2
p(death notice sticks I death notice, offender is black) = 0.581 N
p(death notice sticks I death notice, offender is not black) = 0.631 J
N = 352 (1 Missing Case); X2 w/l df = 0.650; p > .05
0.581-0.631 = -0.050
Test #3
p(penalty trial I death notice sticks, offender is black) = 0.852
p(penalty trial I death notice sticks, offender is not black) = 0.844
N = 212 (1 Missing Case); X2 w/l df= 0.023;p > .05
} 0.852-0.844 = 0.012
Test #4
p(death sentence I penalty trial, offender is black) = 0.452 } 0.452-0.369 = 0.083
p(death sentence I penalty trial, offender is not black) = 0.369
N= 180; X'w/l df = 1.171;p >.05
Test #5
p(death sentence I death eligible offense, offender is black) = 0.054 0.
p(death sentence I death eligible offense, offender is not black) = 0.072 3 0.054-0.072 = -0.018
N = 1291 (20 Missing Cases); X2 w/t df= 1.453;p > .05
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Table 3
Processing of Victim Race Groups at Various Stages of Maryland Death Penalty System
Test #1
p(death notice ] death eligible offense, at least one victim is white) = 0.421 )
p(death notice I death eligible offense, no white victim) = 0.171 0.421-0.171 = 0.250
N = 1,247 (64 Missing Cases); XI w/1 df = 94.311 ; p < .05
Test #2
p(death notice sticks death notice, at least one victim is white) = 0.687
p(death notice sticks I death notice, no white victim) = 0.458
N = 350 (3 Missing Cases); XI w/1 df= 17.303; p < .05
Test #3
p(penalty trial I death notice sticks, at least one victim is white) = 0.880
p(penalty trial I death notice sticks, no white victim) = 0.746
N = 213; XI w/l df = 5.620; p <.05
0.687-0.458 = 0.229
0.880-0.746 = 0.134
Test #4
p(death sentence I penalty trial, at least one victim is white) = 0.439
p(death sentence I penalty trial, no white victim) = 0.366
N = 180; X2 w/l df = 0.692; p >.05
Test #5
} 0.439-0.366 = 0.073
p(death sentence I death eligible offense, at least one victim is white) = 0.112 1
p(death sentence I death eligible offense, no white victim) = 0.0215 0.112-0.021 = .091
N = 1,247 (64 Missing Cases); X2 w/1 df = 43.544;p <.05
2004]
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Table 6A
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of County on Notice Decision (N = 1,202)
Covariate
Intercept
Number of prior violent felony convictions
Multiple victim case
Any of the victims a stranger to defendant
Defendant has a history of alcohol abuse
Defendant under age 21 at time of offense
Defendant unable to control conduct due to mental/emotional problems
Defendant actively evaded arrest
Defendant persisted in attack even after death was certain
Any of the victims forced to beg/plead for their lives
Any of the victims killed execution style
Any of the victims' murder took a long time to complete
Any of the victims in own house when defendant intruded
Any of the victims defenseless due to frail condition/illness
Any of the victims sexually abused before killing
Defendant made full confession to aggravating circumstances
Defense claims case is based on circumstantial evidence
County = Anne Arundel
County = Baltimore City
County = Baltimore County
County = Harford
County = Montgomery
County = Prince George's
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
Type III Test For County Effect (X2(6) = 191.92; p < .05)
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 23 Parameter Estimates)
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 76 Parameter Estimates)
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/53 df
Coefficient X 2
-0.635 8.94 *
0.152 2.99
0.636 8.68 *
0.626 14.14 *
-0.436 5.73 *
-0.615 9.72 *
0.810 11.55 *
0.449 2.92
0.704 9.19 *
0.611 3.69
0.436 3.27
-0.691 5.39 *
-0.307 2.54
1.511 10.76 *
0.844 9.93 *
0.523 5.77 *
-0.151 0.10
-1.306 14.60 *
-2.948 117.32 *
0.565 4.78 *
0.076 0.03
-1.943 20.61 *
-0.409 3.02
-490.13
-466.67
46.92 NS
* p < .05
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Table 6B
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects
of County on "Notice Sticks" Decision (N = 327)
Covariate Coefficient X
2
Intercept -0.956 8.85 *
Any prior violent felony convictions 0.631 4.14 *
Defendant has a history of alcohol abuse 0.122 0.18
Defendant maintains innocence 0.938 10.26 *
Defendant expressed pleasure at the killing 1.906 5.27 *
Defendant forced his/her way into place of murder of any of the victims 1.123 9.19 *
Any of the victims defenseless due to advanced age 0.960 4.85 *
Any of the victims defenseless due to gross size/strength disparity -0.568 2.38
Victim was a law enforcement officer 2.911 7.40 *
County = Anne Arundel 1.036 2.75
County = Baltimore City 0.364 0.47
County = Baltimore County 1.542 15.31 *
County = Harford 0.008 0.00
County = Montgomery 0.070 0.01
County = Prince George's -0.375 1.00
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
Type IH Test For County Effect (X'(,) = 26.97; p < .05)
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 15 Parameter Estimates) -165.67
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 64 Parameter Estimates) -146.91
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/49 df 37.52
Ns
* p < .05
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Table 6C
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of
County on Whether Case Advances to a Penalty Trial (N = 198)
Covariate Coefficient x
2
Intercept -0.135 0.06
Defendant has history of mental illness/emotional problems 1.463 4.49 *
Defendant expressed remorse for crime 0.679 0.88
Defendant maintains innocence 1.842 11.74*
Defendant alleged to have committed additional crimes contemporaneously 1.292 4.88 *
Physical evidence linking defendant to the crime was present 1.466 4.54 *
County = Anne Arundel 1.018 0.69
County = Baltimore City 0.020 0.00
County = Baltimore County 0.567 0.75
County = Harford -0.579 0.25
County = Montgomery
County = Prince George's -0.598 0.77
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
Type III Test For County Effect (X2(5 = 4.00; p > .05)
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; I I Parameter Estimates) -61.00
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 39 Parameter Estimates) -46.53
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/28 df 28.94 NS
* p < .05
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Table 6D
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of
County on Whether Defendant Receives a Death Sentence (N = 169)
Covariate Coefficient X
2
Intercept -0.939 3.15
Multiple victim case 1.029 5.93 *
Defendant has spouse and/or family -0.527 1.74
Defendant expressed remorse for crime -0.886 3.40
Defendant alleged to have committed additional crimes contemporaneously 0.896 5.62 *
Any of the victims offered no resistance to killer -0.900 4.49 *
Any of the victims bedridden or physically handicapped 0.967 1.33
Any of the victims asleep, just awakened or in bedroom -0.791 2.57
An informant or jail-house snitch testified against defendant 1.133 4.77 *
County = Anne Arundel 0.661 0.72
County = Baltimore City 0.762 1.09
County = Baltimore County 1.046 4.18 *
County = Harford 1.090 1.31
County = Montgomery -0.436 0.18
County = Prince George's -0.498 0.60
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
Type III Test For County Effect (X2(,) = 8.77; p> .05)
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 15 Parameter Estimates) -101.76
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 40 Parameter Estimates) -92.39
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/22 df 18.75 NS
* p < .05
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Table 6E
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of County
on Whether Defendant Receives A Death Sentence (N = 1,202)
Covariate Coefficient X
2
Intercept -3.992 68.92 *
Number of prior violent felony convictions 0.590 21.54 *
Multiple victim case 1.321 13.47 *
Any of the victims a stranger to defendant 0.772 6.15 *
Defendant has a history of alcohol abuse -0.462 1.87
Defendant was physically abused as a child 0.591 2.12
Defendant was sexually abused as a child 1.608 8.99 *
Any of the victims suffered multiple trauma -0.664 2.86
Any of the victims killed execution style 1.213 11.40 *
There was another victim that was injured but not killed by defendant -0.594 1.45
Any of the victims sexually abused after killing 1.786 6.34 *
Defendant made full confession to aggravating circumstances 0.940 8.09 *
One eyewitness to the event testified 0.605 3.40
County = Anne Arundel -0.155 0.07
County = Baltimore City -2.221 17.05 *
County = Baltimore County 1.012 5.93 *
County = Harford -0.208 0.07
County = Montgomery -1.726 3.77
County = Prince George's -1.184 5.07 *
County = Other Counties (Reference Category) -------
Type II Test For County Effect (X'Q6 ) = 56.37; p < .05)
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 19 Parameter Estimates) -181.95
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 75 Parameter Estimates) -148.32
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/56 df 67.26
* p < .05
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Table 6F
Estimated Outcome Probability by County (Covariates Held Constant at their Means)
p(death notice filed I death eligible case) p(death notice sticks I death notice filed)
County
Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
Anne Arundel 0.234 0.201 0.722 0.783
Baltimore City 0.055 0.046 0.643 0.648
Baltimore County 0.662 0.620 0.840 0.857
Harford 0.532 0.500 0.471 0.563
Montgomery 0.200 0.117 0.636 0.579
Prince George's 0.367 0.381 0.392 0.468
Other Counties 0.468 0.481 0.525 0.561
p(penalty trial death notice sticks) p(death sentence penalty trial)
County
Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
Anne Arundel 0.923 0.965 0.417 0.441
Baltimore City 0.778 0.911 0.500 0.466
Baltimore County 0.911 0.946 0.458 0.537
Harford 0.750 0.849 0.500 0.548
Montgomery 0.286 0.209
Prince George's 0.742 0.847 0.348 0.199
Other Counties 0.857 0.909 0.371 0.290
p(death sentence I death eligible case)
County
Unadjusted Adjusted
Anne Arundel 0.065 0.047
Baltimore City 0.014 0.006
Baltimore County 0.232 0.137
Harford 0.094 0.045
Montgomery 0.036 0.010
Prince George's 0.037 0.017
Other Counties 0.076 0.055
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Table 7A
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of
Defendant Race on Notice Decision (N = 1,202 - 18 Missing = 1,184)
Covariate Coefficient X
Intercept -0.317 1.63
Number of prior violent felony convictions 0.141 2.52
Defendant has a history of alcohol abuse -0.320 3.08
Defendant unable to control conduct due to mental/emotional problems 0.953 16.45 *
Defendant admitted crime -0.609 7.81 *
Defendant maintains innocence -0.603 10.19 *
Defendant alleged to have committed additional crimes contemporaneously 0.318 2.98
Defendant actively evaded arrest 0.438 2.65
Defendant interfered with judicial process 2.014 10.04 *
Defendant persisted in attack even after death was certain 0.836 13.60 *
Any of the victims killed execution style 0.486 4.08 *
There was another victim that was injured but not killed by defendant -0.570 3.87 *
Any of the victims killed in front of another person (not co-defendant) 0.313 2.67
Any of the victims' murder took a long time to complete -0.413 2.17
Any of the victims in own house when defendant intruded -0.087 0.22
Defendant made full confession to aggravating circumstances 0.866 12.89 *
Defense claims state's burden of proof not met 0.793 2.53
County = Anne Arundel -1.349 15.13 *
County = Baltimore City -2.951 111.96 *
County = Baltimore County 0.800 9.60 *
County = Harford 0.066 0.02
County = Montgomery -1.471 13.25 *
County = Prince George's -0.534 4.95 *
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
Offender is Black (vs. Others) 0.221 1.34 NS
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 24 Parameter Estimates) -496.82
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 65 Parameter Estimates) -474.52
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/41 df 44.60
N S
* p < .05
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Table 7B
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Defendant
Race on "Notice Sticks" Decision (N = 327 - 1 Missing = 326)
Covariate Coefficient x
2
Intercept -0.257 0.50
Defendant unable to control conduct due to alcohol/drugs 0.652 4.45 *
Defendant has history of physical abuse as a child 1.166 7.59 *
Defendant admitted crime -0.712 5.59 *
Defendant implicated in other killing(s) -1.009 3.29
Defendant forced his/her way into place of murder of any of the victims 1.394 13.97 *
Any of the victims not clothed or in bedclothes at time of killing -0.616 1.87
Any of the victims asleep, just awakened or in bedroom 0.725 1.65
Any of the victims thrown in a body of water after being killed -0.850 1.39
Defense claims state's burden of proof not met 1.777 3.51
Victim was a law enforcement officer 2.890 7.23 *
County = Anne Arundel 0.938 2.15
County = Baltimore City 0.674 1.61
County = Baltimore County 1.677 18.29 *
County = Harford -0.709 1.19
County = Montgomery 0.171 0.05
County = Prince George's -0.391 1.04
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
Offender is Black (vs. Others) -0.278 0.72
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 18 Parameter Estimates) -165.79
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 51 Parameter Estimates) -152.71
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/33 df 26.16 NS
* p < .05
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Table 7C
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Defendant
Race on Whether Case Advances to a Penalty Trial (N = 198 - I Missing = 197)
Covariate Coefficient X
2
Intercept 
-0.356 0.35
Number of prior violent felony convictions 1.560 14.07 *
Defendant has a history of alcohol abuse 1.479 4.01 *
Defendant unable to control conduct due to alcohol/drugs 1.872 5.89 *
Defendant unable to control conduct due to mental/emotional problems 4.207 9.63 *
Defendant has spouse and/or family 1.477 4.81 *
Defendant has no major criminal history 3.435 12.55 *
Defendant tried to hide or dispose of bodies of any of the victims -2.075 5.37 *
Murder committed in course of kidnapping 2.361 4.06 *
Offender is Black (vs. Others) 0.358 0.35
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 10 Parameter Estimates) -52.84
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 35 Parameter Estimates) -39.58
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/25 df 26.53 NS
* p < .05
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Table 7D
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Defendant's
Race on Whether Defendant Receives a Death Sentence (N = 169)
Covariate Coefficient X
2
Intercept -1.025 10.78 *
Number of prior violent felony convictions 0.347 5.66 *
Defendant was sexually abused as a child 0.777 2.10
Defendant implicated in other killing(s) 1.666 5.69 *
Offender is Black (vs. Others) 0.283 0.61
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 5 Parameter Estimates) -106.66
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 36 Parameter Estimates) -94.88
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/31 df 23.56 NS
• p < .05
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Table 7E
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Defendant's
Race on Whether Defendant Receives a Death Sentence (N = 1,202 - 18 = 1,184)
Covariate Coefficient x
2
Intercept 
-4.940 81.09*
Number of prior violent felony convictions 0.504 15.41 *
Defendant unable to control conduct due to mental/emotional problems 0.831 4.45 *
Defendant alleged to have committed additional crimes contemporaneously 0.921 8.19*
Defendant interfered with judicial process 1.604 4.69"
Any of the victims killed with a bizarre or unusual weapon 0.994 5.08*
Any of the victims suffered multiple trauma -0.939 4.76*
Any of the victims killed execution style 1.027 7.94*
Defendant tried to hide or dispose of bodies of any of the victims 1.019 6.51 *
Any of the victims killed in front of another person (not co-defendant) 0.722 4.85 *
Any of the victims have children or grandchildren 0.686 4.35 *
Any of the victims mutilated in some way before killing 1.062 2.70
Defendant slapped, kicked, or punched any of the victims before death -1.051 4.01 *
Defendant made full confession to first-degree murder to police -0.767 2.52
Defendant made full confession to aggravating circumstances 1.420 11.21 *
An informant or jail-house snitch testified against defendant 1.085 7.72 *
County = Anne Arundel 0.052 0.01
County = Baltimore City -1.488 7.28 *
County = Baltimore County 1.703 15.72 *
County = Harford 0.828 1.04
County = Montgomery 
-0.445 0.28
County = Prince George's 
-1.007 3.33
County = Other Counties (Reference Category) --------
Offender is Black (vs. Others) 0.340 0.93
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 23 Parameter Estimates) -179.41
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 59 Parameter Estimates) -160.94
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/36 df 36.94 NS
* p < .05
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Table 7F
Estimated Outcome Probability by Defendant Race (Covariates Held Constant at their Means)
Unadjusted Estimates Adjusted Estimates
Conditional Black Non-Black Black Non-Black
Probability Defendant Defendant Difference Defendant Defendant Difference
p(death notice filed I
death eligible case)
p(death notice sticks
death notice filed)
p(penalty trial I
death notice sticks)
p(death sentence I
penalty trial)
p(death sentence I
death eligible case)
0.242
0.581
0.861
0.457
0.055
0.368 -0.126
0.647 -0.066
0.853 0.008
0.359 0.098
0.073 -0.018
0.198
0.531
0.970
0.444
0.019
0.165 0.033
0.600 -0.069
0.957 0.013
0.376 0.068
0.014 0.005
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Table 8A
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of
Victim Race on Notice Decision (N = 1,202 - 54 Missing = 1,148)
Covariate Coefficient x
2
Intercept -0.756 9.52 *
Any of the victims a stranger to defendant 0.416 5.89 *
Defendant has a history of alcohol abuse -0.477 6.69 *
Defendant under age 21 at time of offense -0.642 10.47 *
Defendant unable to control conduct due to mental/emotional problems 0.827 11.93 *
Defendant had trouble holding job 0.279 2.71
Defendant admitted crime -0.286 1.97
Defendant implicated in other killing(s) 0.769 4.60 *
Defendant persisted in attack even after death was certain 0.590 6.44 *
Any of the victims forced to beg/plead for life 0.788 6.18 *
Any of the victims killed execution style 0.605 6.44 *
Murder took a long time to complete -0.820 7.59 *
Any of the victims defenseless because of size/strength disparity 0.739 9.19 *
Any of the victims have children or grandchildren -0.272 2.09
Defendant made full confession to aggravating circumstances 0.679 7.67 *
County = Anne Arundel -1.289 13.92 *
County = Baltimore City -2.749 96.40 *
County = Baltimore County 0.489 3.65
County = Harford -0.087 0.04
County = Montgomery -1.542 13.64 *
County = Prince George's -0.105 0.18
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
Victim is White (vs. Others) 0.669 12.31 *
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 22 Parameter Estimates) -476.88
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 62 Parameter Estimates) -463.16
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/40 df 27.44 NS
* p < .05
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Table 8B
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of
Victim Race on "Notice Sticks" Decision (N = 327 - 1 Missing = 326)
Covariate Coefficient X
2
Intercept -1.952 16.68 *
Any of the victims has a criminal history -1.298 3.08
Any of the victims killed execution style 1.202 8.92 *
Any of the victims killed in front of another person (not co-defendant) 0.657 4.39 *
Any of the victims defenseless due to advanced age 0.854 3.94 *
Any of the victims asleep or just awakened at time of attack 0.660 2.39
Any of the victims defenseless due to gross size/strength disparity -0.746 3.95 *
Defendant slapped, kicked, or punched any of the victims before death 0.780 4.26 *
Number of Statutory Aggravating Circumstances 0.569 6.95 *
County = Anne Arundel 1.722 5.60 *
County = Baltimore City 0.882 2.75
County = Baltimore County 1.483 14.92 *
County = Harford -1.138 3.16
County = Montgomery -0.100 0.02
County = Prince George's -0.413 1.23
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
Victim is White (vs. Others) 1.017 10.68 *
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 16 Parameter Estimates) -171.84
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 42 Parameter Estimates) -153.41
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/26 df 36.86 NS
• p < .05
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Table 8C
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Victim Race
on Whether Case Advances to a Penalty Trial (N = 198)
Covariate Coefficient x2
Version #1
Intercept
Any of the victims a stranger to defendant
Any of the victims killed execution style
Victim is White (vs. Others)
Log-likelhood (Reduced Model; 4 Parameter Estimates)
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 25 Parameter Estimates)
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/21 df
Version #2
Intercept
Any of the victims a stranger to defendant
Victim is White (vs. Others)
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 3 Parameter Estimates)
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 25 Parameter Estimates)
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/22 df
0.569 2.26
0.988 4.83 *
1.023 2.35
0.837 3.40
-75.45
-62.29
26.32 NS
0.803 5.19
1.088 5.97 *
0.667 2.29
-76.85
-62.29
29.13 NS
* p < .05
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Table 8D
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects
of Victim Race on Whether A Death Sentence Is Imposed (N = 169)
Covariate Coefficient V
Version #1
Intercept -0.781 3.82
Any of the victims a stranger to defendant 0.279 0.68
Defendant implicated in other killings 1.685 5.70 *
Victim is White (vs. Others) 0.206 0.24
Log-likelhood (Reduced Model; 4 Parameter Estimates) -110.83
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 30 Parameter Estimates) -101.61
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/26 df 18.44 NS
Version #2
Intercept -0.676 3.21
Defendant implicated in other killings 1.754 6.29 *
Victim is White (vs. Others) 0.285 0.48
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 3 Parameter Estimates) -111.18
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 30 Parameter Estimates) -101.61
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/27 df 19.14 NS
* p <.05
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Table 8E
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Defendant's
Race on Whether Defendant Receives a Death Sentence (N = 1,202 - 54 = 1,148)
Covariate Coefficient x
2
Intercept -4.889 67.46 *
Any of the victims a stranger to defendant 0.419 1.71
Defendant has a history of alcohol abuse -1.167 9.14 *
Defendant has a history of drug abuse 0.846 5.77 *
Defendant was sexually abused as a child 2.131 18.98*
Defendant implicated in other killing(s) 1.115 4.71 *
Defendant forced his/her way into place of murder of any of the victims 1.054 10.16 *
Any of the victims suffered multiple trauma -1.340 8.82 *
Any of the victims killed execution style 1.250 11.14'
Defendant tried to hide or dispose of bodies of any of the victims 1.196 9.20 *
Crime scene was described as a bloody mess or particularly gruesome 0.860 3.70
Any of the victims' murder took long time to complete -1.234 4.55 *
Any of the victims mutilated in some way before killing 1.042 2.61
Any of the victims sexually abused after killing 1.723 4.72 *
Defendant made full confession to first-degree murder to police -0.859 3.39
Defendant made full confession to aggravating circumstances 1.455 11.77*
One eyewitness to the event testified 0.908 7.24'
County = Anne Arundel -0.019 0.00 *
County = Baltimore City -1.564 7.21 *
County = Baltimore County 0.822 3.60
County = Harford -0.295 0.14
County = Montgomery -1.436 2.50
County = Prince George's -0.991 2.94
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
Victim is White (vs. Others) 1.317 10.68'
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 24 Parameter Estimates) -172.70
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 60 Parameter Estimates) -155.82
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/36 df 33.76 NS
* p < .05
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Table 8F
Stepwise Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Defendant's
Race on Whether Defendant Receives a Death Sentence (N = 1,202 - 54 = 1,148)
Covariate Coefficient x2
Intercept -5.750 77.79 *
Number of prior violent felony convictions 0.779 25.51 *
Multiple victim case 1.775 23.14*
Any of the victims a stranger to defendant 0.672 3.94 *
Defendant has history of sexual abuse as a child 1.322 7.46 *
Defendant has no major criminal history 0.724 3.20
Defendant expressed pleasure at the killing 2.374 21.88 *
Defendant alleged to have committed additional crimes contemporaneously 0.752 7.05 *
Defendant forced his/her way into place of murder of any of the victims 0.916 7.53 *
Defendant tried to hide or dispose of bodies of any of the victims 0.784 4.28 *
Any of the victims defenseless due to advanced age 0.752 3.67
Defendant slapped, kicked, or punched any of the victims before death -1.610 8.43 *
County = Anne Arundel 0.737 1.34
County = Baltimore City -1.595 7.03 *
County = Baltimore County 1.379 9.49 *
County = Harford 0.550 0.48
County = Montgomery -0.953 1.05
County = Prince George's -0.668 1.29
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
Victim is White (vs. Others) 0.644 2.62
Log-likelihood (18 Parameters) -163.28
* p < .05
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Estimated Outcome Probability by Victim Race (Covariates Held Constant at their Means)
Unadjusted Estimates Adjusted Estimates
Conditional White Nonwhite White Nonwhite
Probability Victim Victim Difference Victim Victim Difference
p(death notice filed I
death eligible case) 0.431 0.169 0.262 0.254 0.149 0.105
p(death notice sticks I
death notice filed) 0.691 0.440 0.251 0.729 0.492 0.237
p(penalty trial I
death notice sticks) 0.887 0.750 0.137
Version #1 0.899 0.793 0.106
Version #2 0.889 0.805 0.084
p(death sentence I
penalty trial) 0.421 0.417 0.004
Version #1 0.432 0.382 0.050
Version #2 0.417 0.368 0.049
p(death sentence I
death eligible case) 0.111 0.023 0.088
Version #1 0.031 0.009 0.022"
Version #2 0.018 0.009 0.009
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Table 9A
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Defendant and
Victim Race on Notice Decision (N = 1,202 - 72 Missing = 1,130)
Covariate Coefficient X
2
Intercept 0.443 2.11
Number of prior violent felony convictions (0,1,2,3+) 0.214 4.72 *
Multiple victim case 0.799 10.88 *
Any of the victims a stranger to defendant 0.429 5.34 *
Defendant has a history of alcohol abuse -0.410 4.63 *
Defendant under age 21 -0.597 8.37 *
Defendant unable to control conduct due to mental/emotional problems 0.884 13.20 *
Defendant admitted crime -0.608 6.79 *
Defendant maintains innocence -0.619 9.47 *
Defendant has no major criminal history 0.491 5.40 *
Defendant actively evaded arrest 0.515 3.64
Defendant implicated in other killing(s) 0.822 4.83 *
Defendant persisted in attack even after death was certain 0.673 7.72 *
Any of the victims forced to beg/plead for their lives 0.697 4.38 *
Any of the victims killed execution style 0.436 2.84
Any of the victims killed in presence of another person (not co-defendant) -0.183 0.79
Any of the victims' murder took a long time to complete -0.870 8.49 *
Any of the victims have children or grandchildren -0.311 2.38
Any of the victims physically/verbally mistreated prior to killing 0.535 8.23 *
Defendant made full confession to aggravating circumstances 0.559 4.72 *
County = Anne Arundel -1.309 13.52 *
County = Baltimore City -2.881 97.65 *
County = Baltimore County 0.439 2.72
County = Harford -0.189 0.18
County = Montgomery -1.922 18.67 *
County - Prince George's -0.312 1.42
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
White Defendant - White Victim -0.786 10.21 *
Black Defendant - Black Victim -1.122 22.16 *
Other Combinations -0.904 6.70 *
Black Defendant - White Victim (Reference Category)
Type lII Test For Effect of Defendant-Victim Race: X -(3) 23.83; p < .05
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 29 Parameter Estimates) -454.43
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 76 Parameter Estimates) -437.66
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/47 df 33.54 NS
* p <. 0 5
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Table 9B
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Defendant and
Victim Race on the "Notice Sticks" Decision (N = 327 - 2 Missing = 325)
Covariate Coefficient x
2
Intercept -0.286 0.61
Number of prior violent felony convictions 0.266 3.24
Defendant admitted crime -0.696 5.25 *
Defendant forced his/her way into place of murder of any of the victims 1.270 10.11 *
Any of the victims not clothed or in bedclothes at time of killing -0.371 1.04
Any of the victims killed execution style 0.753 2.85
Crime scene was described as a bloody mess or particularly gruesome -0.230 0.31
Defendant slapped, kicked, or punched any of the victims before death 0.802 3.52
Any of the victims burned after killing 2.054 5.03 *
Victim was a law enforcement officer 3.436 8.93 *
County = Anne Arundel 1.617 6.13 *
County = Baltimore City 1.240 4.93 *
County = Baltimore County 1.806 20.21 *
County = Harford -0.620 0.90
County = Montgomery -0.025 0.00
County = Prince George's -0.325 0.67
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
White Defendant - White Victim 0.223 0.37
Black Defendant - Black Victim -0.972 6.48
Other Combinations -1.285 4.11
Black Defendant - White Victim (Reference Category)
Type III Test For Effect of Defendant-Victim Race: X2 (3 )= 12.80; p < .05
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 19 Parameter Estimates) -161.99
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 50 Parameter Estimates) -148.62 NS
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/31 df 26.73
* p < .05
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Table 9C
Stepwise Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Defendant and
Victim Race on the "Notice Sticks" Decision (N = 327 - 3 Missing = 324)
Covariate Coefficient x
2
Intercept -0.679 3.60
Defendant has history of physical abuse as a child 1.009 6.76 *
Defendant maintains innocence 0.953 10.68 *
Defendant forced his/her way into place of murder of any of the victims 1.201 11.04 *
Victim was a law enforcement officer 2.766 6.68 *
County = Anne Arundel 1.214 3.53
County = Baltimore City 0.852 2.77
County = Baltimore County 1.518 15.06 *
County = Harford -0.350 0.31
County = Montgomery -0.009 0.00
County = Prince George's -0.201 0.28
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
White Defendant - White Victim 0.090 0.07
Black Defendant - Black Victim -0.612 2.93
Other Combinations -0.857 1.96
Black Defendant - White Victim (Reference Category)
Type III Test For Effect of Defendant-Victim Race: X3l() - 5.638; p > .05
* p < .05
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Table 9D
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Defendant and
Victim Race on Whether Case Advances to a Penalty Trial (N = 198 - 1 Missing = 197)
Covariate Coefficient X'
Intercept -1.153 0.96
Any prior violent felony convictions 1.922 8.26 *
Any of the victims a stranger to defendant 1.677 7.62 *
Defendant unable to control conduct due to mental/emotional problems 3.364 7.63 *
Defendant has spouse and/or family 1.241 3.56
Defendant has history of drug or alcohol use/abuse 0.788 1.64
Defendant has no major criminal history 2.402 10.67 *
Defendant tried to hide or dispose of bodies of any of the victims -0.846 1.42
Any of the victims' murder took a long time to complete - 1.887 4.12 *
White Defendant - White Victim -0.036 0.00
Black Defendant - Black Victim -0.013 0.00
Black Defendant - White Victim 1.082 0.77
Other Combinations (Reference Category)
Type III Test For Effect of Defendant-Victim Race: X'(3) = 3.19; p > .05
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 12 Parameter Estimates) -50.12
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 41 Parameter Estimates) -36.00
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/29 df 28.24 NS
* p < .05
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Table 9E
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Defendant
and Victim Race on Whether Death Sentence is Imposed (N = 169)
Covariate Coefficient X2
Intercept -2.308 4.07 *
Any prior violent felony convictions 0.565 2.75
Any of the victims a stranger to defendant 0.373 0.99
Defendant was sexually abused as a child 0.901 .2.74
Defendant implicated in other killing(s) 1.557 4.71 *
White Defendant - White Victim 1.113 0.96
Black Defendant - Black Victim 1.449 1.49
Black Defendant - White Victim 1.441 1.66'
Other Combinations (Reference Category)
Type III Test For Effect of Defendant-Victim Race: X2(3) = 2.25;p> .05
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 8 Parameter Estimates) -106.35
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 43 Parameter Estimates) -89.95
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/35 df 32.80 NS
* p < .05
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Table 9F
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Defendant and
Victim Race on Imposition of Death Sentence (N = 1,202 - 72 Missing = 1,130)
Covariate Coefficient x
2
Intercept -3.761 42.15 *
Number of prior violent felony convictions 0.519 15.17 *
Multiple victim case 1.287 10.81 *
Any of the victims a stranger to defendant 0.400 1.39
Defendant was sexually abused as a child 1.966 16.54 *
Defendant implicated in other killing(s) 0.995 3.93 *
Defendant forced his/her way into place of murder of any of the victims 1.004 9.27 *
Any of the victims' murder(s) planned for more than five minutes 0.361 1.12
Any of the victims suffered multiple trauma -0.813 3.71
Any of the victims killed execution style 0.994 6.34 *
Another victim injured but not killed -0.610 1.37
Any of the victims sexually abused after killing 1.112 1.89
Any of the victims thrown in water after death 1.268 2.31
Defendant made full confession to aggravating circumstances 0.983 8.46 *
One eyewitness to the event testified 0.779 5.18 *
County = Anne Arundel 0.180 0.08
County = Baltimore City -1.962 8.26 *
County = Baltimore County 1.038 5.50 *
County = Harford 0.074 0.01
County = Montgomery -1.534 2.37
County = Prince George's -0.855 2.17
County = Other Counties (Reference Category)
White Defendant - White Victim -0.937 5.45 *
Black Defendant - Black Victim -1.302 8.56 *
Other Combinations -2.050 3.61
Black Defendant - White Victim (Reference Category)
Type III Test For Effect of Defendant-Victim Race: X2(= 12.06; p <.05
Log-likelihood (Reduced Model; 24 Parameter Estimates) -168.05
Log-likelihood (Full Model; 75 Parameter Estimates) -141.51
Likelihood Ratio Test of Full v. Reduced Model w/51 df 53.07 NS
* p<. 0 5
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Table 9G
Estimated Outcome Probability by Defendant-Victim Race Groups
p(death notice filed Ideath eligible case) p(death notice sticks Ideath notice filed) (1)
Group
Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
White D - White V 0.411 0.187 0.677 0.768
Black D - Black V 0.157 0.141 0.443 0.500
Black D - White V 0.463 0.336 0.699 0.726
Other Combinations 0.279 0.170 0.455 0.423
p(death notice sticks Ideath notice filed) (2) p(penalty trial ldeath notice sticks)
Group
Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
White D - White V 0.677 0.715 0.870 0.925
Black D - Black V 0.443 0.555 0.769 0.927
Black D - White V 0.699 0.697 0.911 0.974
Other Combinations 0.455 0.494 0.700 0.928
p(death sentence I penalty trial) p(death sentence I death eligible case)
Group
Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
White D - White V 0.367 0.377 0.089 0.017
Black D - Black V 0.467 0.459 0.025 0.012
Black D - White V 0.472 0.457 0.139 0.041
Other Combinations 0.143 0.166 0.013 0.006
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